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The new millennium has dawned, but Washington State is still
misinterpreting the 19th century. The state believes it cannot protect
environmental or aesthetic values in its state forests unless someone
actually buys the trees or land. If no one comes up with enough cold
cash, it is just too bad about the animals that live on the land and the
people who hike there.
Washington's courts and government agencies have assumed the
following: (1) The land that the federal government gave Washington
at statehood for the benefit of the "common schools" and other public
institutions is held by the state as a trust. (2) This trust is exactly
analogous to a private trust. (3) The state's "common school lands"
and other granted lands must therefore be managed under the com-
mon law principles that govern private trusts. (4) The state owes a
duty of "undivided loyalty" to the beneficiaries. (5) Undivided loyalty
requires the state to manage the land for maximum revenue. (6)
Revenue production cannot be sacrificed to the goal of preserving
environmental or aesthetic values. In light of Washington's law and
history, these conclusions are simply wrong. They find no support in
federal statute, state constitutional language, the history of the lands,
or state legislation. It is time to take a fresh look at the obligations
Washington assumed with regard to managing its forests when it
became a state.
If one actually looks at the history, the statutes, the state consti-
tution, and a century of court decisions, the following becomes clear:
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" A broader public trust has always existed; the Washington
Constitution explicitly recognizes this. Because of this broad,
enduring trust, the environmental and aesthetic values of the
granted lands must be safeguarded for all the people.
* Courts have incorrectly defined Washington's narrower fidu-
ciary duty by equating the state's 1889 Enabling Act with the
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910.
* The state's fiduciary duty prevents it from granting financial
breaks to favored constituents, not from protecting species or
habitat.
* Washington's constitutional framers consciously rejected the
idea that granted lands should produce maximum revenue.
* Neither Congress nor the framers gave the State of Washing-
ton any guidance about the management of granted lands.
They could not; no one managed American forests in 1889.
* Not one of the subsequent court rulings has required state
land to be managed in any particular way and not precludes
management that is guided in part by environmental values.
In this Article, I will first point out that neither the federal Ena-
bling Act nor the Washington Constitution explicitly requires the
state to hold its granted lands in trust for the common schools or other
named institutions. Next, I will argue that even if the granted lands
are trusts, they are not common law trusts and therefore should not be
managed under common law trust principles. Third, I will demon-
strate that neither Congress nor the framers of the Washington Con-
stitution expected the lands to generate maximum revenue. Fourth, I
will show that preventing thefts and giveaways of public land and
timber was the only real legislative intent of both Congress and the
framers. Fifth, I will demonstrate that that neither Congress nor the
framers expected the lands to be managed in any particular way.
Finally, I will argue that the Washington Constitution creates a broad
constitutional trust, which requires the granted lands to be managed
under the public trust doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
The stakes are high. The State of Washington owns some 2.1
million acres of forest, including more than 1.1 million acres managed
for the benefit of the public schools. Most of this land is a legacy, at
least indirectly, of statehood.'
1. The state originally received 2,432,564 acres for the benefit of the common schools. It
currently manages 1,781,617 acres of common school land. Of that total, 1,111,640 acres (62%)
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When Washington entered the union in 1889, the federal gov-
ernment gave the state sections 16 and 36 in every township "for the
support of common schools,",2 and granted to the state other public
land for support of an agricultural college, "a scientific school, normal
schools, public buildings at the State capital, and State charitable, edu-
cational, penal, and reformatory institutions., 3 If someone else had
already claimed the common school sections of a township, the state
could choose other lands in lieu of those originally granted.4
The idea of granting lands to a state to support education was not
new. Beginning with Ohio in 1803, every new state created from ter-
ritory that was not part of the original 13 colonies received gifts of
public land to support schools.' Until 1846, each new state received
one section in every township to support public schools. However, a
single section did not generate enough income to provide adequate
support. A United States Land Commissioner observed that when
Congress established the system of public lands, granting one section
per township "doubtless appeared munificent, but experience has
proved it to be inadequate." 6 People needed at least one school per
township, but the single section of granted land in each township did
not ordinarily produce enough annual revenue to pay a teacher for
even one month.'
Starting in 1846, Congress granted each state two sections which,
by the Land Commissioner's calculations, was also inadequate.' The
are forested. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, STATE OF THE TRUSTS REPORT
17, 25 (1997).
2. Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
3. § 17, 25 Stat. at 681. All public land that had not been part of the original 13 colonies
was surveyed in townships and sections. Each township formed a six-mile square. Each 36
square miles were divided into 36 numbered sections.
4. § 10, 25 Stat. at 679.
5. "[T]he General Land Ordinance of 1785 ... initiated the program of land grants for
schools, providing that lot number sixteen in every township would be reserved 'for the mainte-
nance of public schools within the said township."' Sally K. Fairfax, et al., The School Trust
Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 805 (1992).
6. THOMAS WILLIAM BIBB, HISTORY OF EARLY COMMON SCHOOL EDUCATION IN
WASHINGTON (1929).
It is obviously necessary that at least one school should be established in each of these
townships; and to do this they have only one section of land ... worth about $800.
To invest this sum safely, it cannot be made to yield more than $48 per annum, which
will not pay the salary of a teacher for a single month; and the whole of the principal
would not enable a township to erect a suitable common school edifice, and employ a
teacher for one year. It is evident, therefore, that this provision does not go far to
accomplish the original design; and that, without the aid of other means, the citizens
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act that created Washington Territory in 1853 set aside two sections in
each township to support the "common schools."9  There was no
mechanism for selling the lands, so the schools received no money
benefit, but the principle of holding lands for the benefit of schools
was established.
The Enabling Act merely carried out the basic design created in
1853. Territorial officials expected the federal grants to make the new
state a player in the frenzy of land speculation that obsessed Wash-
ington's leading citizens."° Not wanting to leave the disposal of the
granted lands entirely up to these officials, Congress laid down rules
outlining how the lands could be sold and how the state should handle
the proceeds of any sale. This Enabling Act specified that "all lands
granted for educational purposes shall be disposed of only at public
sale, and at a price not less than ten dollars per acre, the proceeds to
constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only shall be
expended in the support of said schools."" The Act also allowed the
state to lease the lands for periods of not more than five years. 2
The original text of the Washington State Constitution spells out
how the granted lands and the resources they contain may be sold or
leased, as well as how the state must treat the money from a sale or
lease. Article XVI states, "[n]one of the lands granted to the state for
education purposes shall be sold otherwise than at public auction to
the highest bidder."' 3 The land must be appraised and the price must
at least equal the appraised value.' 4 Under this article, no more than
one-fourth of the land could be sold before January 1, 1895, and not
more than half of the land could be sold before January 1, 1905.5
Article IX states that the revenue from the sale of land or timber flows
into the common school fund, and that all revenues from that fund
"shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools. ''6
9. Organic Act, ch. 90, § 20, 10 Stat. 172 (1853). "[W]hen the lands in said Territory shall
be surveyed under the direction of the Government of the United States, preparatory to bringing
the same into market or otherwise disposing thereof, sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in
each township in said Territory shall be, and the same are hereby, reserved for the purpose of
being applied to common schools in said Territory." Id.
10. EDMOND S. MEANY, HISTORY OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 316 (1909).
11. Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 679 (1889).
12. Id.
13. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.§3.
16. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (amended 1966). Additions to the common school fund
were derived from "the proceeds of the sale of, stone, minerals or property other than timber and
other crops from school and state lands... [and] the principal of all funds arising from the sale




Article XVI allows the common school fund to be invested as author-
ized by law. 7
Before statehood, territorial officials looked on the granted lands
as a ticket to sudden riches. Territorial taxpayers expected the new
lands to free them from the burden of school taxes. Statehood "was a
plunge into an ocean of supposed wealth.... Everybody knew the
State had abundant natural resources which would be developed at
once. Therefore, all these were treated like money in the bank."'"
The dream of overnight prosperity was never realistic. Most of
the granted lands proved to be next-to-worthless in the short run.
Mill companies, land speculators, prospectors, settlers, and the North-
ern Pacific Railroad had already done their best to lock up the most
valuable acreage. "In locating an exact route from the Columbia to
Puget Sound, [Northern Pacific Railroad] engineers tried to lay track
through the most heavily timbered areas, so that valuable timberland
would be included in the land grant."' 9 Out of all the individuals and
companies claiming land, the state institutions picked last. Even other
public entities stood closer to the head of the line. "The state's granted
trust lands were awarded after all of the other federal programs had
received their land."2" Much of the remaining land, however valuable
it might become in the indefinite future, lay too far from navigable
water or steel rails to be feasible for logging or even market farming.
Not surprisingly, "[w]indfall profits anticipated from the state's land
sales instead went to timber companies and railroad companies, which
owned better positioned and more productive lands than did the
state."21
Because the state received land after all other claimants, the com-
mon school lands never paid all the costs of public education. Tax-
payers had their burden lightened, but not lifted. "Beginning at
statehood and lasting for about 30 years, the granted trust lands pro-
vided very little money for the educational and institutional needs of
the state."22 The meager income from property taxes, general funds,
and higher education tuitions kept the schools impoverished through-
out Washington's early years. 3
17. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (amended 1966).
18. MEANY, supra note 10, at 290.
19. ROBERT E. FICKEN, THE FORESTED LAND: A HISTORY OF LUMBERING IN WEST-
ERN WASHINGTON 45 (1987),
20. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 8.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 9.
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The state quickly sold off all of its land that was marketable. In
the first flush of statehood, every level of government rushed to spend
and borrow money. To pay the bills and the interest, the first Wash-
ington legislature created a mechanism for the sale and lease of public
lands and created a State Land Commission "to facilitate the proc-
ess." 2
4
After alert citizens had purchased the best public lands and sto-
len the timber off some of the rest, sales of public land largely ground
to a halt. "Land that was expected to sell, by the year 1920, did not
sell. Leasing and timber sales became the major revenue generating
activities for state lands."2
By the 1920s, people started to recognize that Washington's for-
ests were disappearing, just as the forests of Wisconsin and Michigan
had vanished in the 19th century. There were no reforestation pro-
grams, and fire control was minimal or nonexistent. Many landown-
ers simply cut trees and then abandoned the land. Fires often roared
through the slash, and Washington counties took over miles of
charred stumps in lieu of back taxes.
In the 1920s, as a step toward reforestation, the Washington leg-
islature passed statutes enabling the state to acquire and manage cut-
over land and hold tax-delinquent land in trust for the counties. Now,
the state has acquired more than 600,000 acres of these "Forest Board
lands" under the legislation of the 192 Os.
26
Around the same time that the legislature passed these statutes,
the state began to contemplate setting up a sustained yield forest on
federally granted land on the Olympic Peninsula. In 1932, the out-
going Commissioner of Public Lands, Clark V. Savidge, wrote that
"[i]t would be a most unfortunate thing for the State of Washington if
the great block of timber in the Olympic Peninsula is not kept togeth-
er for a Sustained Yield Forest. Such a forest would ... be the begin-
ning of the policy of reforestation. '27 The state did establish a
sustained yield forest, and in 1938, the Washington Supreme Court
upheld the state's right to keep the forest intact rather than selling it
24. MEANY, supra note 10 at 291. "[Pjrovisions were promptly enacted by which the State,
counties, cities, towns, and school districts could create bonded indebtedness. These new privi-
leges were seized upon and used by the various boards and officers having authority.... [Tihe
greatest control of the new riches was centered in the Legislature, and to that arena was carried
the battle of the spoils.... Of course it was recognized that all these expenditures must be met
by revenue, and to stimulate this, efforts were made to hasten the realization of money from
public lands and from taxation on newly developed resources." Id. at 290.
25. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 9.
26. See 1921 Wash. Laws 169; 1923 Wash. Laws 154; 1927 Wash. Laws 288; WASH-
INGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 2.
27. COMMISSIONER OF PUB. LANDS BIENNIAL REP. 3 (1932).
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piecemeal.2  The court reasoned that "there is no provision in the
constitution requiring the state to dispose of its granted lands."
29
The overall management of state forests was neither rational nor
efficient; it remained haphazard, negligent and, in some cases, corrupt.
Management was split among a Commissioner of Public Lands, a
State Forest Board, a Board of State Land Commissioners, a Capitol
Committee, the Department of Conservation and Development's Div-
ision of Forestry, Sustained Yield Forest Committees, and, for certain
specific functions, the Director of Licensing, the Tax Commission,
and the Secretary of State.3" No single agency was responsible for the
forest land.
In 1942, Governor Arthur B. Langlie appointed a Forest Advi-
sory Commission, which reported that "[t]he bulk of the state land has
inadequate forest management, and county tax-delinquent lands in
most cases are 'no-man's' land."3' Among other things, the Commis-
sion urged the state to consolidate management of state forests into
one agency, free of political influence. 2
The state did not follow the Commission's recommendations.
Ten years later, Special Assistant Attorney General Alfred McBee
reported widespread mismanagement and theft of state timber, and
claimed that a secretary for the Land Board had actively solicited
bribes from people who wanted to cut state timber.33 "[B]ribe money
was demanded in order to get applications on the Board agenda....
The Secretary... solicited money from applicants.., reminding
[them) that political campaigns cost money, and that the donors to the
campaign fund [of the Commissioner of Public Lands] ... would
receive prompt service. 34
Finally, in 1957, after nearly 70 years of mismanagement and
corruption, the state acted on some of the Forest Advisory Commis-
sion's recommendations and consolidated management of all federally
granted and Forest Board lands in a new Department of Natural
Resources. 3' However, management practices did not change over-
28. State ex tel. Forks Shingle Co. v. Martin, 196 Wash. 494, 83 P.2d 755 (1938).
29. Id. at 501, 83 P.2d at 759.
30. See 1957 Wash. Laws 38.
31. FOREST ADVISORY COMM., A LONG-RANGE FOREST PROGRAM FOR THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON 9 (1942).
32. Id. at 28.
33. ALFRED McBEE, REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS OF STATE OF
WASHINGTON 7-8 (1952).
34. Id. at 9, 11.
35. 1957 Wash. Laws 38. The 1957 legislature passed a bill introduced by the Washington
State Legislative Council, a bipartisan committee of legislators who did research for and recom-
mended legislation to their colleagues. The final version represented a compromise, with a bill
2000]
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night. The new department did not even complete an inventory of its
holdings until 1966.
By that time, state support of the public schools left a good deal
to be desired. School districts routinely relied on special levies for up
to 25% of their operating and maintenance budgets.36 They relied on
local bonds and a trickle of state bond money to build new schools. In
the early and mid-1960s, Washington went through a population
boom. Boeing added tens of thousands of workers to the Seattle area
and the state's population mushroomed as job seekers moved in from
other parts of the country. Public school districts were inundated by
new students and were running out of space,37 but local taxpayers were
not eager to pay for new buildings.
School officials and PTAs consequently persuaded voters to pass
two constitutional amendments." One allowed the state more discre-
tion in choosing how to invest the permanent common school fund.39
The second created a Common School Construction Fund, into which
all future revenue from the sale of common school lands and resources
introduced by the state school directors. Similar legislation had failed many times. Legislators
had long realized that consolidation made sense, but they had disagreed on the details, above all
on the role to be played by the Commissioner of Public Lands. Some favored abolishing the
Land Commissioner's office, which had been linked more than once to corruption, and which
kept management of the state forests in political hands. Obviously, they lost. See generally
WASHINGTON ST. LEGIS. COUNCIL, SUBCOMM. ON ST. GOV'T, PROGRESS REPORT (1955);
WASHINGTON ST. LEGIS. COUNCIL, REPORT ON RESULTS OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO 1957
LEGISLATURE AND WORK DURING THE SESSION (1958).
36. "More and more, school districts are being forced to rely on special levies for more and
more of their total budgets. Many already fall back on the levy for as much as a quarter of oper-
ating and maintenance expenses." Robert Cour, Schools Put Futures On Line, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, November 8, 1966, at 6.
37. "Superintendent [of Public Schools Louis] Bruno and his assistants Monday totaled up
30,000 new students in kindergarten through Grade 12 over last year's enrollment with more
scheduled for next spring and fall when more workers bring their families to their new boom
jobs." Id.
The Boeing boom accelerated a process that had started when aircraft, shipyard, and other
workers moved to Washington during World War II.
Since World War II, all facilities from kindergarten through college have been
strained to accommodate the swelling numbers caused by the population explosion
and the popular demand for a college education. Overcrowding has been a prob-
lem.... By 1960, the enrollment in the state's high schools had reached 161,900; and
in 1967, there were 331,081 secondary students.
CECIL DRYDEN, DRYDEN'S HISTORY OF WASHINGTON 365 (1968).
38. The chairman of the Statewide Parents and Citizens for Education Committee, which
backed both amendments and a state bond issue, told voters that "The alternative to the state
matching funds provided by these three... measures is higher local property taxes if necessary
construction is to continue. And, at the rapidly expanding rate of school enrollment, massive
construction programs are urgently needed." Three Issues on Ballot Affect School-Building, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, November 6, 1966, at 82.
39. The amendment allows the state to invest the common school fund "as authorized by
law." WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (amended 1966).
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and all future interest on the permanent fund would flow.4" Hence-
forth, the granted lands would finance bricks and mortar, not instruc-
tion. Evidently, local taxpayers thought these measures would help
them escape the financial burden of building new schools.
The Common School Construction Fund has enabled the state to
contribute nontax dollars to school construction costs, but the fund
has always fallen far short of covering the full bill. Into the 1980s, it
paid about one-half of new school construction costs. Funding at even
that level, however, could not last. Construction costs were rising and
construction needs were developing out of phase with the fluctuations
of the timber market.
Compounding the problem, the state was deliberately liquidating
its old-growth forests. At the given rate of liquidation, when the old
growth was gone, the value of state timber sales was going to plunge.
Federal listing of the old-growth-dependent Northern Spotted Owl
and Marbled Murrelet as threatened species just accelerated the proc-
ess. When the state set aside its remaining old growth as protected
habitat, income from the state lands plummeted.
Currently, the income from the common school construction
fund covers only about 25% of school construction costs. 41 This 25%
represents the income from the more than 1.7 million acres of com-
mon school lands that the state still owns, including more than 1.1
million acres of forest. Neither the Enabling Act nor the Washington
State Constitution says anything about how the state should manage
these lands or the roughly 400,000 acres of granted forest land dedi-
cated to other institutions. Major court decisions in Washington and
elsewhere have made it clear that the land itself, the rights to use or
extract resources from it, and the contractual obligations to pay for
timber growing on it cannot be given away or sold without full com-
pensation. 4' The courts have also stated that money generated by the
sale of land, lease of land, or sale of resources from granted lands may
be used only in very limited ways.43 The courts have not, however,
thoroughly considered forest management.
40. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (amended 1966).
41. "In recent years, those revenues have been declining. For the 1999-2001 biennium...
only $78-85 million of the $326 total (or 25%) [of the amount budgeted for capital construction]
will come from trust land revenues." WASHINGTON ST. SCH. DIREcToRS ASS'N, 1999 LEGIS-
LATIVE SUMMARY 6 (1999).
42. See, e.g., Lassen v. Arizona Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 469 (1966); County of Ska-
mania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 685 P.2d 576 (1984).
43. See, e.g., Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919); State ex rel. Hellar v. Young, 21
Wash. 391, 392, 59 P. 220 (1899).
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In Washington, the supreme court's 1984 ruling in County of
Skamania v. State" remains the last word on the granted lands. Two
years before Skamania, while Washington was in the depths of a
major recession that hit timber communities especially hard, the state
legislature decided to let some timber companies escape or extend
their contracts to cut timber on school and county trust lands."
State timber is sold at auction. A company that submits a win-
ning bid usually must post a relatively small performance bond and
pay a ten-percent deposit; it can then wait two or three years before
cutting the timber.46 The purchaser company bases its bid on what it
believes the market price for the lumber will be two or three years
hence;47 the companies that bought state timber from 1978 through
1980 guessed incorrectly. United States housing starts had hovered
around two million per year in the late 1970s. Virtually everyone in
the forest products industry assumed home construction rates would
stay at that level through the 1980s. Because demand seemed a sure
thing, a lack of raw material seemed the only variable that could pre-
vent forest products companies from profiting. Companies that did
not own their own timber, which included virtually all but the largest
firms, raced to acquire timber on state and federal land. Timber
prices shot up. In 1980, the average price of timber on state land was
$337 per thousand board feet.4" The companies whose contracts were
at issue in Skamania bid from $300 to $800 per thousand board feet.49
In the early 1980s, the housing market plummeted. In 1982,
housing starts sank to 1.07 million, the lowest total since 1946.50 Tim-
ber prices fell accordingly. By the start of 1982, the market price for a
thousand board feet had dropped to $175." 1 Companies that had
bought state timber under the higher purchase price could not honor
their contracts without losing money. 2
In response to this crisis, the Washington legislature passed the
Forest Products Industry Recovery Act of 1982, which enabled a com-
44. County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 685 P.2d 576 (1984).
45. RICHARD STRICKLAND & DANIEL JACK CHASAN, COASTAL WASHINGTON 178
(1989). Washington's unemployment rate averaged 12.1% in 1982, and the rates in timber-
dependent counties were even higher. Grays Harbor County's unemployment rate averaged
15.5, Pacific County's 16.8, and Clallam County's 19.1. Id.
46. Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 129, 685 P.2d at 578.
47. Id. at 129, 685 P.2d at 578.
48. Daniel Jack Chasan, Falling Timber, THE (SEATTLE) WEEKLY, November 6-12, 1985,
at 32.
49. Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 130, 685 P.2d at 578.
50. Chasan, supra note 48, at 32.
51. Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 130, 685 P.2d at 578.
52. Id. at 130, 685 P.2d at 578.
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pany to either extend its contract at no cost or escape its contract with
no penalty except forfeiture of the initial 10% deposit and a small
administrative charge. 3 Any company that had defaulted on its con-
tract before the Act passed was allowed to reinstate its contract pursu-
ant to the Act.
54
The legislature had been casting about desperately for ways to
deal with the recession. Legislators reestablished a sales tax on food
that the people had removed by initiative just five years before. 5
Although the legislature claimed it was passing the Forest Products
Industry Recovery Act to benefit the entire state economy,5 6 in reality,
job losses and mill closures in the chronically depressed timber com-
munities had little impact on the rest of the state.57 This was not
1942, when an estimated 61 per cent of Washington jobs rested on the
forest products industry."
The Act contained some general statements asserting that what
was good for the forest products industry was good for the trust bene-
ficiaries,5 9 but the legislation was clearly designed to benefit specific
timber companies and specific rural timber counties, where unem-
53. Id. at 130, 685 P.2d at 578-79; see WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.1335 (1991).
54. Skamania, 102 Wash. at 130, 685 P.2d at 579.
55. By 1982, with statewide unemployment at 12.5 percent, the Republican majority was
willing to try just about anything to put some money into the state's coffers.... At the end
of the 1982 session, with the help of a handful of Democrats eager to pass something and go
home, they restored the sales tax on food, which the people had removed by initiative.
They voted in a state lottery bill, which legislatures had been summarily rejecting for dec-
ades.-... The legislature [had] started scrambling to get control of the budget in 1981. The
House majority decided to underfund pensions, delay school funding, and borrow money
from the school construction fund.... The House [subsequently] voted to reduce public
school spending by 1 percent and to delay a pay raise for state workers.
DANIEL JACK CHASAN, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: THE POLITICAL CAREER AND TIMES OF
JOHN L. O'BRIEN 179-81 (1990).
56. Forest Products Industry Recovery Act, ch. 222, § 1(1), 1982 Wash. Laws (expired
1984).
57. For example, in the timber-dependent communities of coastal Washington,
[e]ver since World War II, unemployment.., had been higher than Washington's
average unemployment rate, anyway. The recession of the early 1980s just widened
the gap.... The coast was simply falling further behind. In constant dollars,
between 1977 and 1984, per capita personal income in Washington State rose a total
of 5.5 percent. In Pacific County, it rose only 2.7 percent. In Grays Harbor County,
it dropped 2 percent.
STRICKLAND & CHASAN, supra note 45, at 178.
58. Lloyd D. Weir, Northwestern Forests Are Being Restored, SEATTLE TIMES, January 4,
1942, at 6.
59. It began with a legislative finding that "[a] competitive, financially healthy forest prod-
ucts industry is important to the economic well-being of the state and the trust beneficiaries."
Forest Products Industry Recovery Act, ch. 222, § 1(1)(a), 1982 Wash. Laws (expired 1984).
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ployment figures were high and prospects for the future were increas-
ingly bleak.6"
In County of Skamania v. State, Skamania County sued the state,
arguing that Washington had violated its fiduciary duty of undivided
loyalty to the schools and counties that were the beneficiaries of the
granted and forest board lands. The State Board of Education and the
University of Washington Board of Regents subsequently joined the
County of Skamania as plaintiffs.61
The court agreed with the plaintiffs. In a unanimous decision
written by Justice Brachtenbach, the court assumed that the lands
were trusts and looked beyond the legislative assurances that helping
timber companies would ultimately help the beneficiaries.
[T]he Act provides direct, tangible benefits to the contract pur-
chasers, at the expense of the trust beneficiaries .... [T]he pri-
mary purpose and effect of this legislation was to benefit the
timber industry and the state economy in general, at the expense
of the trust beneficiaries. This divided loyalty constitutes a
breach of trust.62
The court also held that:
this Act ... fails to satisfy the constitutional requirement that
the State seeks full market value for trust assets .... [N]o pru-
60. The timber industry has experienced a long-term decline as a proportion of employ-
ment in the state. The industry now accounts for 2 percent of the state's total employment,
down from 11 percent in the late 1940s, 8 percent in 1960, and 4 percent in 1980.... The
Washington State Economic Development Board acknowledged in 1988 that there are "two
Washingtons"-the urban areas and the rural counties. While urban areas registered
impressive job gains after the 1981-82 recession, many rural counties had not recovered
even six years later.
MELANIE J. ROWLAND, ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF WASH. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY AND MAN-
AGEMENT, OLD-GROWTH FORESTS AND TIMBER TOWNS: THINKING ABOUT TOMORROW
16(1993).
Unemployment in King County may hover around the national average, but unem-
ployment in the timber counties is never out of double digits. And even those hor-
rendously high numbers probably tell less than the whole story; since they don't
reflect the people who have exhausted unemployment benefits, have stopped looking
for work, or have otherwise dropped out of the official statistics. Mark McDermott of
the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee staff points out that in Grays Harbor
County, for example, the percentage of the adult population in the work force
dropped 12 percent in the past year. Add that 12 percent to the official unemploy-
ment figures, and you may have an unemployment rate that is 22 percent instead of
the official 10.5 percent.
Daniel Jack Chasan, Wilted Evergreen, THE (SEATTLE) WEEKLY, April 15-April 21, 1987, at
32.
61. Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 131, 685 P.2d at 579.
62. Id. at 136, 685 P.2d at 581-82.
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dent trustee could conclude that the unilateral termination of
these contracts was in the best interests of the trusts.63
The court shot down the Act as a blatant legislative bailout for a
particular industry and rebuked a legislature that had arguably broken
faith with the public and had at least skirted the edges of its legal obli-
61gations.
The state had already moved on. The recession ended in 1983
and voters elected a new group of legislators. If the court had merely
struck down the Forest Products Industry Recovery Act of 1982, no
one would remember Skamania. The decision has had lasting effect,
however, because of its discourse on the granted lands.
Every court that has considered the issue.., has concluded that
these are real, enforceable trusts that impose upon the State the
same fiduciary duties applicable to private trustees .... A trus-
tee must act with undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiaries, to
the exclusion of all other interests... [The state] may not sacri-
fice this goal to pursue other objectives, no matter how laudable
those objectives may be.65
People have inferred from these statements that the state cannot
protect environmental or aesthetic values in its management of
granted lands unless it compensates trust beneficiaries for the full
market value for any revenue foregone or unless it follows the State
Environmental Policy Act, the Forest Practices Act, or another law of
general application.66
When the state has protected lands of particular environmental
value as Natural Resource Conservation Areas, the legislature has
appropriated money to replace the lands with others of equal value.67
When the state modified its management of 1.6 million acres and
deferred harvesting 15,000 acres of old growth as part of a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP) designed to protect spotted owl and mar-
bled murrelet habitat, no land was set aside permanently, and the
HCP was justified as a means of avoiding even more draconian
restrictions on logging under the federal Endangered Species Act. As
the Department of Natural Resources explained, "by anticipating the
63. Id. at 139, 685 P.2d at 583.
64. A recent study of American state trust lands calls the legislation itself "an ill-disguised
raid on the trust." JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS 162 (1996).
65. Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 136, 685 P.2d at 581-82.
66. See Noel v. Cole, 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982); West Norman Timber, Inc.
v. State, 37 Wash. 2d 467, 224 P.2d 635 (1950); 1996 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 11.
67. The state now manages 47,359 acres in 23 Natural Resource conservation Areas and
25,593 acres in 44 Natural Area Preserves. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES,
INTERESTING FACTS ABOUT DNR AND STATE-OWNED LANDS.
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habitat needs of at-risk species and other species, the plan assures that
DNR's long-term timber sales program can continue without major
disruptions caused by federal listings of endangered species."68 The
Department said its "new sustainable harvest calculations indicate
state trust lands can produce an average of 655 million board feet of
timber each year under an HCP-higher than the 600 million board
feet that DNR has been able to offer for sale in fiscal years 1995 and
1996."69
Critics have pointed out the logical flaws in the Skamania court's
reasoning. Sally K. Fairfax 0 has written that the court relied on Unit-
ed States Supreme Court decisions about Arizona and New Mexico"without apparent awareness that these cases apply only to Arizona
and New Mexico and are particularly inappropriate in the Skamania
case. "71
So far, however, the logical flaws have been legally irrelevant.
Skamania provides a classic illustration of the old saw that the
supreme court is not the supreme court because it is right; it is right
because it is the supreme court. In a 1996 advisory opinion, the
Washington Attorney General observed, "We are well aware that
commentators have criticized Skamania for relying on cases that inter-
preted the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act and for failing to ana-
lyze the terms of Washington's Enabling Act.... The unanimous
decision of our supreme court in Skamania, however, represents the
law of this state.
72
But Skamania left plenty of constitutional territory unexplored.
Even if one overlooks the Skamania court's flawed reasoning and con-
cedes that the lands are genuine trusts that the state must manage as a
fiduciary, one may conclude that the state need not-in fact, must
not-manage the granted lands solely to earn maximum revenue for
the schools and other named beneficiaries.
68. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES ANN. REP. 5 (1996).
69. Id. Not everyone bought that argument. "'I am not convinced that the proposed HCP
as agreed to... is in either the immediate or long-term interests of the trust beneficiaries,' said
David Thorud, a [Board of Natural Resources] member who voted against the plan. 'The board
should not commit to a 70- to 100-year legally binding contract considering the numerous legal,
fiduciary and ecological issues that have repeatedly been raised but still not satisfactorily
addressed.' ... The plan was also faulted by the Washington Environmental Council.. . '(T]he
plan guarantees a lifetime of logging, while gambling with public resources, such as clean water,
wildlife and salmon,' the WEC said in a statement." Hal Spencer, Long-Term Timber Resource
Plan Gets OK, Ensures Continued Harvest Over 1.63 Million Acres, SEATTLE TIMES, November
6, 1996, at CS.
70. Associate Dean of the College of Natural Resources at the University of California at
Berkeley and authority on granted lands.
71. Fairfax, et al., supra note 5, at 844.




A. Washington Does Not Hold Its Granted Lands in Common Law
Trust for the Public Schools or Any Other Specific Institution
If Congress had meant to create trusts, with all the rigid fiduciary
duties that the common law imposes, it would have explicitly done so.
It did not; the Enabling Act never uses the word "trust."
A trust is defined as "a property right held by one party for the
use of another."73 It may also be defined as "a fiduciary relationship
in which one person holds a property interest, subject to an equitable
obligation to keep or use that interest for the benefit of another."74
Under any definition, one cannot create an express common law trust
without demonstrating a clear intent to do so.7" The Enabling Act of
1889, which made Washington a state, says merely that "upon the
admission" of Washington, Montana, North Dakota or South Dakota
to statehood, "sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in every town-
ship.., are hereby granted to said states for support of common
schools."76 The Act is consistent with the intent of the federal statute
that created Washington Territory in 1853, which says, "when the
lands in said Territory shall be surveyed under the direction of the
government of the United States... sections numbered sixteen and
thirty-six in each township ... shall be, and the same are hereby,
reserved for the purpose of being applied to common schools in said
Territory."77
Subsequently, in the 1910 legislation that created the states of
Arizona and New Mexico, Congress did use the word "trust."7 It
said flatly that any violation of the Enabling Act's terms would con-
stitute "a breach of trust."79 Washington's Enabling Act contains no
such language. The fact that Congress used it in one place, but not
another, indicates that Congress had no intent to create a trust in the
earlier cases.8"
73. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES 2 (2d ed. 1978) (quoting Kiplinger v. Kiplinger, 113 N.E. 292, 293 (Ind. 1916)).
74. Id. at 1.
75. "An express trust ... is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to
create a trust." Colman v. Colman, 25 Wash. 2d 606, 609, 171 P.2d 691, 692 (1946). A court
can establish a constructive trust without finding that any manifestation of intent existed on the
part of the parties, but courts ruling on the status of granted lands have never suggested that they
were doing so.
76. Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 10, 25 Stat. 679 (1889).
77. Id. § 20.
78. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 28, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
79. Id.
80. "We have found the trust documents not in a federal-state compact, but in state deci-
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By its omissions, Washington's own constitution offers further
evidence that the granted lands are not held in trust. The constitution
never says that the lands are held "in trust" for schools or other named
beneficiaries. Article IX merely defines the common school fund and
says: "the entire revenue derived from the common school fund...
shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools."'"
Article XVI, however, does use the word "trust." It says: "All
the public lands granted to the state are held in trust for all the peo-
ple."' 12 By using the word in Article XVI but not in Article IX, the
framers showed that they did not mean to apply common-law trust
principles to the common school lands. From their choice of lan-
guage, one can infer that the lands are merely dedicated to public pur-
poses, not held in trust for specific beneficiaries.
83
Courts have not only ignored the lack of trust language in Wash-
ington's constitution and Enabling Act, they have also erred by
wrongly equating pre-1910 enabling acts with an act passed in 1910.
When the Skamania court said, "these are real, enforceable trusts that
impose upon the State the same fiduciary duties applicable to private
trustees," it cited Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Dept., in
which the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Arizona
Enabling Act, held that Arizona could not grant easements across
granted lands without compensating the beneficiaries8 4 The Court
stated that the Arizona Enabling Act "contains a specific enumeration
of the purposes for which the lands were granted and the enumeration
is necessarily exclusive of other purpose. '"85
sions and state commitments." Fairfax, et al., supra note 5, at 908.
81. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. "[T]he common school fund... shall be derived from
[inter alia] ... the sale of timber, stone minerals or other property from school and state lands...
[and] the principal of all funds arising from the sale of lands and other property which have
been... granted to the state for the support of common schools." WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
82. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
83. John B. Arum, Old-Growth Forests on State School Lands Dedicated to Oblivion?-
Private Trust Theory and the Public Trust, 65 WASH. L. REV. 151 (1990).
The Enabling Act and the constitution do not create an express trust, but merely
dedicate public lands for the purpose of supporting public education. The state
should use principles normally applied to dedications of land .... A private dedica-
tion of land for a specified public purpose does not create a trust relationship unless
the grantor explicitly imposes the equitable duties of a trustee upon the public agency
accepting the grant.
84. Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dept., 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
85. Id. at 467 (quoting Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919). Although Lassen
involved a different enabling act, the principle of that decision applies to Washington's enabling
act. See United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp., 1042 (Wash. 1968). There the
Court stated:
There have been intimations that school land trusts are merely honorary, that there is
a "sacred obligation imposed on (the state's) public faith," but no legal obligation.
These intimations have been dispelled by Lassen v. Arizona. This trust is real, not
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By equating the Arizona statute with Washington's, the Skama-
nia court erected a logical house of cards. It relied on a chain of cases
that had little to do with the facts of Skamania, citing 111.2 Acres of
Land, which cited Lassen, which cited Ervien. Lassen applied only to
the 1910 New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, which established many
conditions for the "[d]isposition of any of said lands, or of any money
or thing of value directly or indirectly derived therefrom," and explic-
itly declared that any violation of its terms would be a breach of
trust.86
Lassen's key passage cites Ervien for the proposition that:
The [New Mexico-Arizona Enabling] Act thus specifically for-
bids the use of "money or thing of value directly or indirectly
derived" from trust lands for any purposes other than those for
which that parcel of land was granted. It requires the creation of
separate trust accounts for each of the designated beneficiaries,
prohibits the transfer of funds among the accounts, and directs
with great precision their administration. "Words more clearly
designed... to create definite and specific trusts and to make
them in all respects separate and independent of each other
could hardly have been chosen."87
In Ervien, the court was not generalizing; it focused narrowly on
the details of the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act. Lassen how-
ever, quoted selectively from Ervien, and by doing so, misrepresented
the significance of the holding. The full text of the Ervien sentence is:
"Words more clearly designed than those of the act of Congress [i.e., the
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act] to create definite and specific
trusts and to make them in all respects separate and independent of
each other could hardly have been chosen."88  In other words, the
Ervien court was talking about a particular piece of legislation, and it
based its statement on the unusual specificity of that legislation.89
Another wall in this house of cards was the court's reliance on
111.2 Acres of Land for the proposition that, "the principle of Lassen
illusory.
Id. at 1049.
86. Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or indirectly
derived therefrom, for any object other than for which such particular lands, or the lands,
from which said money or thing of value shall have been derived, were granted or con-
firmed, or in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of
trust.
Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 28, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
87. Lassen, 385 U.S. at 467 (quoting in part United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277, 279 (8th
Cir. 1917)).
88. United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1917) (emphasis added).
89. Id.
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applies to Washington's enabling act."9  111.2 Acres of Land com-
pared apples to oranges when it equated Washington's Enabling Act
with the significantly different New Mexico-Arizona Act at issue in
Lassen.
Citing Lassen to prove that Congress actually created trusts in all
the western states is ludicrous. Not only is the New Mexico-Arizona
Enabling Act more specific than Washington's, it also declares that
any violation of its terms is a breach of trust.9t To extrapolate from a
state in which Congress used the word "trust" to states in which it did
not makes absolutely no sense.92
The United States Supreme Court, ruling shortly after Congress
passed the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, confirmed the view
that earlier enabling acts created no legal obligations.
In Alabama v. Schmidt, a 1914 case involving Alabama's Ena-
bling Act, Justice Holmes wrote that, "[t]he gift [of land] to the state
is absolute, although, no doubt, as said in Cooper v. Roberts, 'there is a
sacred obligation imposed on its public faith.' But that obligation is
honorary."93 Reading Schmidt together with the New Mexico-Arizona.
Enabling Act, it is clear that Congress put specific trust language into
the Act because it recognized that earlier legislation had not created
trusts.
90. County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 133, 685 P.2d 576, 580 (1984).
91. Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or indirectly
derived therefrom, for any object other than for which such particular lands, or the lands,
from which said money or thing of value shall have been derived, were granted or con-
firmed, or in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of
trust.
Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310 § 28, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
92. "Prior to 1910, the trust obligations that existed arose entirely from state commitments
made in state constitutions." Fairfax, et al., supra note 5, at 809. The Lassen court recognized
that earlier enabling acts had not created the same obligations. It explained that
restrictions placed upon land grants to the States became steadily more rigid.and spe-
cific in the 50 years prior to this Act, as Congress sought to require prudent manage-
ment and thereby to preserve the usefulness of the grants for their intended purposes.
The Senate Committee on the Territories, with the assistance of the Department of
Justice, adopted for the New Mexico-Arizona Act the most satisfactory of the restric-
tions contained in the earlier grants. Its premise was that the grants cannot "be too
carefully safeguarded for the purpose for which they are appropriated." Senator Bev-
eridge described the restrictions as "quite the most important item" in the Enabling
Act, and emphasized that his committee believed that "we were giving the lands to
the States for specific purposes, and that restrictions should be thrown about it which
would assure its being used for those purposes."
Lassen, 385 U.S. at 467.
93. Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 173 (1914) (ruling that a citizen could take granted
land through adverse possession because the grant to the state had been absolute, not legally
conditioned on use for the benefit of the schools).
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When Congress voted in 1990 to prevent Washington from
selling logs to exporters in order to explicitly benefit small sawmills
(which could not afford to pay the high prices earned by export sales)
it did not change the Enabling Act, implying that the Enabling Act
does not require undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries.
Congress made exactly the same trade-off that led to the Skama-
nia litigation: exchanging income to the public schools for a handful
of forest products jobs. The situations were similar to that faced by
the State legislature in 1982. Instead of suffering from a recession,
however, some small mills and timber-dependent towns had been hurt
by a federal court injunction that prohibited cutting old-growth trees
on federal land until the government complied with laws protecting
the Northern Spotted Owl. This time, Congress did not even employ
the legislature's earlier subterfuge of arguing that what helped the for-
est products industry ultimately helped the beneficiaries. Everyone
knew exactly what was going on. "The U.S. Senate approved a ban on
exports of raw logs from public land yesterday in an effort to ease the
impact of spotted-owl protection on Northwest timber communities,"
The Seattle Times reported. 94 In 1997, the state calculated that the
export ban cost the public schools $90 million a year. 95
Congress originally ordered the state to halt the export of timber
from its public lands.96 In other words, it ordered the state to act
against the interests of the trust beneficiaries. If the Enabling Act had
imposed a duty of undivided loyalty, the state would have been caught
between two conflicting mandates, in which case Congress could logi-
cally have amended the Enabling Act as it had already done eight
times before. Because Congress did not amend the Enabling Act, it
must have assumed that the Act did not impose a duty of undivided
loyalty on the state. Because the Skamania court ruled in 1984, it
could not consider this implicit Congressional reasoning.
94. David Schaefer & Tim Healy, Senate OKs Ban on Export of Logs from Public Land;
State School Fund Would Be Affected, SEATTLE TIMES, August 1, 1990, at B1.
95. "The law was intended to help ailing mills throughout the Northwest, but ... some
officials call the export ban a subsidy borne by Washington taxpayers," the Times subsequently
observed. Alex Fryer, Cut Rate; In the Fight to Save Timber Jobs, Something Had to Give: In
Washington's Case, It Was the Revenue That Builds Schools, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 1997, at
F1.
[T]he state estimates that the export ban costs $90 million in lost revenue annually,
revenue that would have gone into a fund spe:ially designated for school construction
in Washington. "Washington schoolchildren are subsidizing Oregon mill operators
[who have been buying much of the timber at reduced prices]," said Phil Aust, an
economist with the Washington State Department of Natural Resources.
Id.
96. This was found unconstitutional. Congress then passed a revised law that relied on the
federal power to regulate foreign commerce.
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The court could have clearly distinguished between the granted
lands and the permanent funds that the Enabling Act established. It
did not. In fact, many courts have failed to distinguish between the
granted lands and the permanent funds supplied by revenue from the
sale or lease of those lands. Obviously, the funds and the land are
distinct entities. The fact that the funds are held in trust if, indeed,
they are-has no bearing on the status of the land.
Lassen relies heavily on language from Ervien,97 which involved
the use of money from a trust fund to advertise the state of New Mexi-
co. Ervien talked about permissible uses of the permanent funds
established by the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, not about
permissible uses of the land itself.
Washington's Enabling Act says that proceeds from the sale or
lease of granted school lands shall "constitute a permanent school
fund, the interest of which only shall be expended in support of said
schools.""8 Article IX, section 3 of the Washington Constitution says
that "[t]he principal of the common school fund shall remain perma-
nent and irreducible" and "[t]he interest accruing on said fund...
shall be exclusively applied to the current use of the common
schools."99 Originally, the constitution specified that the money could
be invested only in federal, state, county or municipal bonds.' 0
Courts have long viewed the permanent fund as a trust. In the 1903
case of State ex rel. Hellar v. Young, the Washington Supreme Court
stated flatly that "the permanent school fund of this state must be
regarded as a trust fund."''
1
Later courts have misinterpreted Hellar and rulings from other
states that treat the permanent funds as trusts. Skamania cited Hellar
as an example of "cases in which courts have applied private trust
principles to federal land grant trusts."'0 2 The court also cited Okla-
homa Education Association v. Nigh, in which an Oklahoma court
found that "the use of trust fund assets for the purpose of subsidizing
farmers and ranchers is contrary to the provisions of the Oklahoma
Constitution, and to the provisions of the Oklahoma Enabling Act.'
10 3
111.2 Acres of Land also cited Hellar inappropriately as authority for
97. The Court cites both Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919) and United States v.
Ervien, 246 F. 277 (8th Cir. 1917).
98. Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 679 (1889).
99. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
100. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (amended 1966).
101. State ex rel. Hellar v. Young, 21 Wash. 391, 392, 58 P. 220 (1899) (ruling that the
state cannot invest permanent school funds in state warrants because warrants are not bonds, as
the constitution requires).
102. Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 133, 685 P.2d at 80.
103. Oklahoma Education Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982).
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the position that Washington's granted lands are held in trust.
According to 111.2 Acres of Land, "Section 10 of the Enabling Act and
Article XVI, section 1 of the Washington Constitution constitute a
declaration of trust.",
0 4
Most of the land that the Department of Natural Resources now
manages is not the same land that the Enabling Act and the Wash-
ington Constitution were written to protect. Some 483,000 acres of
common school lands, which were not subject to the in lieu selection
process established at statehood, were subsequently placed by Con-
gress in the national forests."°5 The state and federal governments dis-
agreed about whether or not the state held title to those lands. In
1913, the two governments negotiated an exchange, °6 which was com-
pleted eight years later.10 7 Most of the original granted lands remained
in isolated, largely unmanageable one-section parcels. After the
Department of Natural Resources was created in 1957, "isolated par-
cels [were consolidated] into blocks of state lands through mutual land
exchanges with private timberland owners, increasing management
efficiency."'
Congress placed restrictions on the use of the lands specifically
granted to the state for educational purposes. It did not explicitly
permit the state to exchange those lands for others and it did not spec-
ify that restrictions applied to the granted lands would also apply to
parcels for which the granted lands were exchanged. Thus, it is not
clear that any land acquired after statehood, except that acquired
through the in lieu selection process, is subject to the original restric-
tions.
B. If the Granted Lands Are Trusts, They Clearly Are
Not Private Trusts, and the Full Range of Common Law Trust
Obligations Does Not Apply to Them
The state clearly has some fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries, but
the Enabling Act and the Washington Constitution do not state or
imply that this duty is a trustee's duty. However, because the basic
definition of a trust is a property right held by one party for the use of
another, 10 9 the granted lands probably qualify, as do the Forest Board
lands. The legislature explicitly said that the Forest Board lands
104. United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (Wash. 1968).
105. COMMISSIONER OF PUB. LANDS, BIENNIAL REP. 5 (1917).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3.
108. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 11.
109. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 73, at 1.
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would be held in trust."0 It does not follow, however, in the words of
Washington's Attorney General, that "the relationship between the
state and the beneficiaries of its land trusts is in every respect like that
of a private trustee.'''
Because these land trusts have been established by statute, they
are not common law trusts. Professor Bogert, cited in Skamania and
by the Attorney General for his discussion of undivided loyalty and
trustee duties, explains that "[s]ome . . . American statutes ... not
only create or provide for the creation of trusts but also give some de-
tails as to the method of execution of the trusts .... To this extent
these statutory trusts are not normal trusts, and the general trust prin-
ciples ... do not apply to them."1 2 In other words, the terms of a
trust lie in the language and intent of the legislation that created them.
To grasp the intent of legislation, one must look at the historical con-
text in which it was passed." 3 The common law is largely irrelevant to
this inquiry.
Before Skamania, no one in Washington applied a common law
duty of "undivided loyalty" to the management of trust lands. Such a
duty was not mentioned in the 1942 report of the Forest Advisory
Commission or the 1938 Forks Shingle Co. decision. In fact, the Forks
Shingle Co. court held that a law "having for its purpose the conserva-
tion of the state's forest resources" on granted land deserved special
deference." 4 When Special Assistant Attorney General Alfred McBee
described the theft and mismanagement of public timber and the
criminality of state employees in 1952, he did not mention a duty of
"undivided loyalty." He did suggest that "state timber lands consti-
tute a trust for the benefit of our present and future school children,"
but he argued only that the trustees should be above suspicion-sug-
gesting the kind of "honorary" obligation described in Schmidt, rather
than a strict application of the common law."'
110. 1927 Wash. Laws 288.
111. 1999 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 3.
112. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra, note 73, at 150.
113. "[A]s was said by Mr. Justice Field in Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Barney, acts making
grants 'are to receive such a construction as will carry out the intent of Congress.... To ascer-
tain that intent, we must look to the condition of the country when the acts were passed, as well
as to the purpose declared on their face, and read all parts of them together."' Johanson v. State
of Washington, 190 U.S. 179, 184 (1903) (citations omitted).
114. State ex rel. Forks Shingle Co. v. Martin, 196 Wash. 494, 502, 83 P.2d 755, 759
(1938).
115. MCBEE, supra note 33, at 17. When allegations of timber thefts and giveaways arose
earlier in the century, legislative investigators and newspaper headline writers expressed outrage
over people stealing from the state. Cheating school children was not the issue, and evidently no
one even thought about common law trust responsibilities. See Roy Otto Hoover, The Public
Land Policy of Washington State: The Initial Period, 1889-1912 217-220 (1967) (unpublished
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Similarly, no one talked about common law trust principles in
1966, when the people established the Common School Construction
Fund, or in 1968, when the people voted down a ban on log exports
from state land." 6  In 1974, when the Department of Natural Re-
sources decided to reduce the timber cut in the Olympic Area before it
reached a previously-scheduled peak, the Department explained that
letting the harvest increase further and then decline "would have
caused a surplus of loggers and equipment in the Olympic Area in the
late 1970's. ' , 117 In addition, "it seemed wise to avoid moving employ-
ees in for a few years, then moving them out..'... The Department did
not even pay lip service to common-law trust principles. It evidently
had no need to do so.
Courts have already ruled that the legislature can pass laws of
general application that limit use of or revenue from the granted
lands.119 "[A]dministration of the trust lands is subject to both state
and federal laws of general application.
' 120
Skamania distinguished between statutes passed under the police
power and those that single out state trust lands.' "State law cannot
single out the trust lands .... However, state laws of general applica-
bility, such as a water quality regulation or historic preservation stat-
ute, can be applied to trust lands even if significant losses are imposed
on the trust." 122 As long as the legislature does not burden the granted
lands any more than it burdens other lands, it can act.
The argument that police power trumps trust obligations may
reflect a necessary priority of governing, and should not distress any-
one who does not want state forests logged in 19th-century fashion.
This argument, however, is disingenuous. The fact is that the legis-
lature can, and does, make exceptions to laws of general application,
Ph.D thesis, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University
Library).
116. The Department of Natural Resources did not originally describe the various land-
grant holdings as "trusts," either. It referred to them simply as "grants." See, e.g., DEPART-
MENT OF NAT. RESOURCES, SOURCE OF INCOME BY LAND GRANT (1960); letter from Bert L.
Cole to B.B. Brodin (May 17, 1960) (on file with author).
117. CHARLES J. CHAMBERS, JR. & EDWARD R. SUMMERFIELD, DEP'T OF NAT. RE-
SOURCES, SUSTAINABLE HARVEST ANALYSIS FISCAL YEARS 1976 AND 1977 9 (1975).
118. Id.
119. Noel v. Cole, 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982); West Norman Timber, Inc. v.
State, 37 Wash. 2d 467, 224 P.2d 635 (1950).
120. 1996 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 11.
121. When the statute is passed pursuant to the police power, the only limitation.., is
that the statute must reasonably tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the
state, and not be contrary to any constitutional provision. Where the statute deals with state
trust lands, however, the permissible goals... are more limited.
Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 132, 685 P.2d at 579-80.
122. SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 64, at 163.
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just as it has done in exempting the forest products industry from
most environmental laws under recent forest and fish legislation. The
legislature could make similar exceptions for state forests. By recog-
nizing the legislature's right to limit management of granted and For-
est Board lands with laws of general application, the courts have essen-
tially recognized that private trust principles are not entirely
appropriate to public land.
Private trust fiduciary principles do not merely require a trustee
to treat beneficiaries no worse than it treats others. Private law trust
fiduciary principles require a trustee to treat beneficiaries better than it
treats others. Bogert says, "the trustee is expected to show more than
ordinary candor, consideration and probity." '123 Cardozo talks about
keeping "the level of conduct for fiduciaries ... at a level higher than
that trodden by the crowd."' 24 Either the state is a trustee or it is not.
If it is, and if it is permitted to pass laws that impinge on the interests
of the trust beneficiaries, then it is not an ordinary trustee, and the
school lands are not an ordinary trust.
The common school and other granted lands have never been
treated as ordinary common-law trusts. For example, the public has
been allowed to use state forest lands for camping, hunting, hiking,
fishing, boating, and motorized off-road travel, even though those uses
may substantially increase the risk of fire on these lands. 2 '
The state has permitted grazing on trust lands at prices that fall
below market rates and do not cover the damage inflicted on the for-
est.' 26 In addition, state timber has often been sold primarily to bene-
123. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 73, at 217.
124. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1929).
125. The Department of Natural Resources has "[b]uilt and maintained 141 trailheads and
campgrounds, 400 miles of trails and other recreational facilities." WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF
NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 5.
126. There is, in the Loomis Forest, a "significant forest resource loss from animals" in the
form of grazing cattle. Throughout our reconnaissance, deleterious effects from grazing
were noted, mainly compacted soils and damage to riparian areas. Heavy puddling was
observed in grazed areas after a rainfall indicating reduced infiltration rates. Substantial
conifer damage and growth reduction were noted in numerous regeneration areas that would
more successfully reforest with less interference from cows.... Natural vegetative diversity
and composition are seriously reduced or altered in heavily grazed areas. It is difficult for us
to imagine how the Department can justify grazing in light of their trust mandates to mini-
mize loss, keep the forest whole and productive, and maintain undivided loyalty to the lar-
ger public beneficiaries.
PUBLIC FORESTRY FOUND., LOOMIS FOREST REPORT 12 (1994). In addition to its direct
impact, grazing complicates the task of long-term forest management. "Due to effects on the
rate of revegetation and impacts on riparian zones, the impacts of livestock grazing in an area fol-
lowing timber harvesting may be far greater than the impacts of either activity taken alone." V.
Alaric Sample, Assessing Cumulative Environmental Impacts: The Case of National Forest Plan-
ning, 21 ENVT'L L. 839, 852 (1991).
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fit local mills rather than to earn top dollar for the common schools. 127
"The less competition a public forest has for its timber sales, the more
closely sales need to be watched and accounted for."' 28
Indeed they do, but on the east side of the Cascades, sales to a
single buyer have constituted business as usual for generations. In
1952, McBee observed, "In the pine territory east of the mountains,
one firm has purchased most of the state timber offered for sale at the
minimum prices fixed by the [Forest] Board (competitive bids being
rare at such sales).' ' 129  He reported that the price was 10% to 30%
below the prices that the Forest Service was getting from the same
purchaser and that competitive bidding in 1950 and 51 might have
yielded the state almost $1 million more. 3 °
The "trust beneficiaries" have suffered from such conduct. But
the beneficiaries on the spot-that is, the local school districts closest
to the sales-have not objected. Indeed, they have applauded and
encouraged such sales.
131
Forest Board lands are explicitly held in trust for the counties,
but they were established for general public benefit.
In the early 1920s,"many lumbermen were concerned for the
future of the region as they confronted three million logged-off acres
in Washington and predictions that the state's virgin timber could last
no more than sixty years. "132 The problem was simple: "[T]he record
127. "[T]he Loomis Forest has consistently produced timber for only one purchaser...
Outside of one isolated sale of less than a million board feet in Lincoln County, Okanogan-High-
lands-Loomis forest timber sales received the lowest average price per MBF [in the state]." PUB-
LIC FORESTRY FOUND., supra note 126 at 23.
128. Id. at 22.
129. MCBEE, supra note 33, at 3.
130. Id. "The prices," he wrote, "were from ten to thirty percent below prices received by
the United States Forest Service for similar timber, similarly situated and sold to the same pur-
chaser.... [I]f the appraisals of the timber sold during the period of 1950 and 1951 had been
increased in accordance with the prices paid on the competitive bids ... the state would have
received almost a million dollars more." Id.
131. DNR behavior in eastern Washington-and, historically, throughout the state-
parallels United States Forest Service behavior as described by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals:
[Florest planning, as practiced by the Forest Service, is a political process replete with
opportunities for the intrusion of bias and abuse. Because national forests are located
near rural communities, foresters make management decisions to support perceived
needs in the communities .... The resulting dependency of these communities on
timber production causes over-harvesting and destructive harvesting methods....
Rural constituencies reliant on timber sale revenues may provoke politicians to place
pressure on the Forest Service to sustain that revenue.
Sierra Club v. Jack Ward Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 251 (6th Cir. 1997).
132. ROBERT E. FICKEN, LUMBER AND POLITICS: THE CAREER OF MARK E. REED 62
(1979). The problem persisted for decades. "The logged-off land problem, according to state
Land Commissioner Clark Savidge, was 'the largest unsettled one that our state has before it
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of... unrestricted use [of private forest lands was] one of 'cut and get
out,' the logged-off lands (having no economic value) being left to
revert to the county for unpaid taxes." '133 Around the same time, Cla-
rence Bagley, who had come to Washington in 1864, wrote that "[o]ur
boasted heritage of inexhaustible forests is nearly dissipated. Unless
the federal government or the state takes over the gigantic task of
reforesting, the lumber industry of Washington will ere long become a
matter of past history."
3 4
As a step toward reforestation, the Washington legislature passed
two statutes that enabled the state to buy and manage cutover land
and a third statute that enabled it to acquire cutover land from coun-
ties, provided that it manage the land in trust for those counties.
35
Collectively, the more than 600,000 acres acquired under these
statutes are known as the Forest Board lands. Most of that acreage is
explicitly held in trust for the counties, but the legislature established
the trust only as a tool for channeling any financial benefits that
flowed from land the counties had relinquished. Such financial bene-
fits are merely incidental, because the legislative intent was nothing
more or less than reforestation.'36
Counties benefit whenever timber is sold, but the state did not
acquire the land in order to generate money for the counties and the
legislature could probably reduce or eliminate the counties' income at
will. "'37 The Forest Board lands clearly are not subject to the common-
law duty of "undivided loyalty."
today."' Id.
133. State v. Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 555, 202 P.2d 906, 907-08 (1949). "Denuded hill-
sides.., made possible the rapid runoff of surface waters, thus increasing the danger from floods
and contributing to costly soil erosion." Id.
134. CLARENCE BAGLEY, HISTORY OF KING COUNTY WASHINGTON (1929).
135. See 1921 Wash. Laws 169; 1923 Wash. Laws 154; 1927 Wash. Laws 288.
136. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 10. This is certainly
the way Forest Board lands were viewed at the time. The statutes themselves made it clear in
their statements of legislative intent. The first was designed to further the "acquirement [sic]
and designation of lands... to be used for the development and growth of timber." 1921 Wash.
Laws 169. The second referred to "the acquiring, seeding, reforestation and administering of
lands for state forests." 1923 Wash. Laws 154. The statute that allowed land to be held in trust
for the counties employed the same language and referred back to the management requirements
established in 1923. There was no hint of undivided loyalty or any requirement to generate any
revenue at all. 1927 Wash. Laws 288. Popular understanding confirmed the plain statements of
legislative intent and the absence of any legislative requirements to generate money for the trust
beneficiaries. "In the last two years, through gifts, purchases and the transfer to the State of tax-
forfeited lands, over 200,000 acres are now embraced in State reforestation forests on which the
regrowth is being promoted naturally by protection and planting." FRANK H. LAMB, SAGAS OF
THE EVERGREENS 331 (1938).
137. Because they are statutory trusts, the legislature is free to change their terms. 1996
Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 11.
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C. The Framers of the Washington Constitution Consciously Rejected the
Idea That the Granted Lands Should Produce Maximum Revenue
The Attorney General has suggested that generating maximum
revenue for the beneficiaries over time should be the management goal
for granted and Forest Board lands. 3 ' To support this thesis, the
Attorney General cites Nigh,139 which is an Oklahoma case.
The framers of Washington's constitution clearly did not choose
maximum revenue as a goal. They received and rejected two petitions
asking them to maximize revenue. Tacoma Typographical Union No.
170 and the Knights of Labor both sent petitions to the constitutional
convention demanding that the granted lands be retained and man-
aged to maximize revenues. 4 The convention was clearly aware of
these petitions, and both were recorded in the convention's journal. In
fact, the Tacoma Typographical Union submitted the very first peti-
tion that the convention received, and the submission made front-page
news in The Seattle Times. 4' Both requests to maximize revenues
were ignored. In other words, the convention was explicitly asked to
manage the lands for maximum revenue, and the convention refused.
The framers were familiar with-and tacitly rejected-language
in other constitutions that required maximum revenue. The drafters
of Washington's constitution familiarized themselves with the con-
stitutional language that other new states had adopted.'42 The last
state admitted to the union before Washington, Colorado, had called
for management of granted lands "in such a manner as will secure the
maximum possible amount therefor."' Washington's convention
could have copied that language. It did not.
The Idaho Constitution, created only one year later by residents
of what was at the time still part of Washington, did call for maximum
revenue.'44 The framers of the Idaho Constitution obviously recog-
138. Id. at 14.
139. Oklahoma Education Ass'n. Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982).
140. See BEVERLY PAULIK ROSENOW, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 188, 793-949 (1962).
141. SEATTLE TIMEs, July 11, 1889, at 1.
142. [T]he Washington convention furnished an excellent example of the tendency of
American states to follow and copy one another in constitutional practices. The delegates
did not come to their task unprepared or empty-handed. They had models and drafts
before them.... [T]he Washington constitution-makers acknowledged the merits of a
number of other state constitutions by reproducing particular provisions either in substance
or verbatim.
ROSENOW, supra note 140, at v.
143. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10(1) (amended 1996).
144. The original language required the state to reap "the maximum amount possible."
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8 (amended 1982).
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nized that Washington's constitutional language did not require
maximum revenue, since they felt compelled to require it explicitly.
The Washington convention also ignored arguments that per-
mitting the land to be sold for its appraised value could not possibly
produce maximum revenue. The Seattle Times editorialized that "it
will be impossible for the state to get anything like the full value of
these lands if they are sold as is proposed.""14 The convention dis-
missed this and other warnings that, by selling off the granted lands,
Washington would squander its heritage.'46 Some members of the
convention may have consciously furthered the interests of mill com-
panies and speculators, others may simply have been fixated on cur-
rent income. Collectively, they showed no interest in securing
maximum long-term revenue for the public schools.
Washington and the United States Congress have recognized
more recently that neither the Washington Constitution nor the Ena-
bling Act requires maximum revenue. The 1968 referendum on log
exports from state land was not cast as a constitutional amendment or
discussed as a constitutional issue, even though an export ban would
have greatly reduced income from state lands.'47 Opponents, includ-
ing the Governor, the Commissioner of Public Lands, and the Super-
intendent of Public Instruction, talked about losing dollars for school
construction and erecting barriers to international trade, not about
violating constitutional requirements or fiduciary duties to maximize
income. 148 Presumably, they did not believe that such requirements or
duties existed.
In addition, Congress' failure to change the Enabling Act when it
voted to ban log exports from state land suggests that the Enabling
Act does not require maximum income.
145. Our Timber Lands, SEATTLE TIMES, August 1, 1889, at 4. "The mill companies will
be the bidders for them, and there will be no competition, for, in this, as in other things, they will
combine together and make an amicable division of the spoils."
146. The influence of the ubiquitous land speculator was demonstrated in connection with
the article on the sale of the common school lands. Urging permanent state ownership of
these lands, Prosser of North Yakima quoted from the reports of Illinois, Wisconsin, and
Michigan, which indicated in each case that the school lands had been sold to benefit the
purchasers rather than the state. Instead of $50,000,000 or more in their school funds, as
the value of their grants warranted, Michigan had $3,381,963, and Wisconsin only
$1,165,041. Prosser insisted further that startling cases of mismanagement and robbery in
California had resulted in a loss to the school fund of probably $100,000,000, 'one of the
most stupendous robberies in the annals of history.
Wilfred J. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Government of Washington Territory 495
(1945) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington) (on file with the University of
Washington Library).
147. A federal export ban actually did after 1991.
148. Log-Export Measure Aims at Restrictions, SEATTLE TIMES, November 3, 1968, at C5.
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Even a court that has ignored the weight of historical evidence
against any requirement for maximum revenue has recognized the
state does not have to generate maximum current revenue. Noting that
"the needs and desires of present beneficiaries may conflict with the
needs and desires of future beneficiaries," the court held that "nothing
in the law ... requires the Department [of Natural Resources] to
maximize current income."149
D. Congress and the Framers Had Only One Overriding Concern: They
Wanted to Prevent the Land from Being Stolen or Given Away
The Washington Constitution forbids making a gift of public
funds or lending state credit to private individuals or corporations."'
Just as the framers did not want public money funneled into private
pockets, they did not want the granted lands enriching anyone but
designated state institutions. Clearly, under any plausible interpreta-
tion of the state's fiduciary duty, neither the legislature nor the
Department of Natural Resources may grant financial favors to named
third parties. It does not follow, however, that the state must avoid
protecting species or habitat. There is no reason to believe that the
framers' concern went beyond corruption. Their concern was well
placed, because the framers lived in a time and place in which public
resources were routinely misappropriated for private profit. The
economy of Washington Territory had been built on the theft of pub-
lic timber. All around Puget Sound, trees on federal land had been cut
and milled without paying the federal treasury a dime.
In the first years of the [forest products] industry, San Fran-
cisco-owned milling companies made no acquisitions....
[L]aws left timber.., virtually free for the taking. A federal
investigation concluded that by the late 1870s, $40 million worth
of timber had been 'stolen' from the public domain on Puget
Sound. Efforts to curb thievery were sporadic and easily cor-
rupted."' 1
Mill companies had also acquired many square miles of federal
timber land through blatant fraud.152 In 1889, when the Washington
149. Okanogan County v. Belcher, No. 95-2-00867-9, at 8 (Chelan County Supr. Ct. May
30, 1996).
150. "No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money,
or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm .. " WASH. CONST. art.
VIII, § 7.
151. ROBERT E. FICKEN & CHARLES P. LEWARNE, WASHINGTON: A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY 34 (1988).
152. Reformers reasoned that carefully worded legalization would end thievery, and they
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State Constitution was written, the pace of land fraud was accelerat-
ing. 153
In other states, lands granted for the benefit of common schools
had already been sold at scandalously low prices-as had the lands
granted Washington Territory for the benefit of what became the
University of Washington, which may also have been sold in violation
of federal law."'
therefore endorsed the timber and Stone Act of 1878, which authorized sale to residents of
Washington, Oregon, California and Nevada of up to 160 acres of timber or mineral land at
$2.50 per acre.... Meant to eliminate corruption, the timber and Stone Act instead allowed
the mill companies to acquire sizeable holdings. The 160-acre limitation was easily circum-
vented by using dummy entrymen. Once these original entrants received patents--compa-
nies paid them from $50 to $125 for their brief service-title was transferred to the mill
firms, often through third parties.... The process was conducted so openly that... news-
papers even reported regular departures of organized groups of entrymen for the Olympia
land office. Two hundred thousand acres of Washington timberland passed into private
hands by this process in 1882 and 1883 alone. Fraud was so widespread that on two occa-
sions the government temporarily halted entries pending investigation. But, in their own
words, mill owners 'fixed' or 'entertained' federal agents assigned to the investigation.
Id. at 35.
In 1883, with the Act's political future highly uncertain, the federal government sent
an inspector to the Puget Sound region to check on local abuses of it. [Port Blakely
Mill Company manager William] Renton saw the handwriting on the wall, but he
wanted to delay the inevitable as long as possible. In June 1883, he wrote to the man-
ager [of the Pope and Talbot sawmill] at Port Gamble, Cyrus Walker, that the "Gov-
ernmental Special Agent for homestead, preemption and timber claims is making an
examination of all such entries. The [Interior] Department has suspended the issuing
of patents on all timber applications until after the agent reports. He is a confidential
friend of [Seattle lawyer] H.C. Struve. Tacoma will give Struve $100 to have him use
his influence to present the matter in as favorable a light as possible to the agent
whom [sic] he thinks can be fixed. I am in favor of doing something in order to give
us a chance until the next meeting of Congress, when the bill will undoubtedly be
repealed, and our day for purchasing cheap land gone forever."
DANIEL JACK CHASAN, THE WATER LINK: A HISTORY OF PUGET SOUND AS A RESOURCE
17(1981).
153. FICKEN, supra note 19, at 51.
154. The federal government had reserved land in Washington for the support of a territo-
rial university. Such lands were normally sold only after the achievement of statehood, but a
special commission headed by the Reverend Daniel Bagley began selling the land set aside
for the University of Washington in 1861. This action, Josiah Keller reported from [the
mill at] Port Gamble, represented "a good opportunity for us." Purchasers... were appar-
ently permitted to make their own selections from government holdings at a price of $1.50
an acre. Lumbermen were the principal beneficiaries.., the Puget Mill Company pur-
chased over 7,000 acres, one-seventh of the total sold. George Meigs, a member of the uni-
versity board of regents, bought 3,300 acres.... To many observers, the close connection
between lumbermen and public officials and the heavy sales to the mills indicated the exis-
tence of a conspiracy to defraud the government. The university land sales, a Seattle news-
paper charged, were "characterized by gross extravagance if not downright fraud." A
federal investigation, based on allegations that Bagley had exceeded his authority appeared
likely.... The political strength of lumbermen, however, was apparently sufficient to pre-
vent invalidation of the transactions.... Bagley and the mill owners, the commissioner [of
the General Land Office] concluded, had "no doubt acted in good faith." This judgment,
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The delegates knew all this. They also knew that most western
politicians lost little sleep over conflicts of interest. "[I]n Western
affairs, business and government were interdependent and symbi-
otic .... It does not take much exposure to Western political history
to lead one to a basic fact: 'conflict of interest' has not always been an
issue of political sensitivity." '
Events quickly confirmed the delegates' fears. "It was soon
clear ... that the commissioner of public lands, an elected official, was
usually more than eager to demonstrate how effectively he could hold
down the level of personal taxation by his vigorous disposal of the
landed inheritance. "156
Within a year after Washington achieved statehood, the Com-
missioner himself observed that "[r]ailroad companies are building
their lines ... over school lands without having secured the right to do
so.... Much of the valuable timber on school lands is being
destroyed or removed by trespassers."" 7 Two years later, he observed
that county commissioners had been given the task of appraising
school lands, and the "temptation is great to favor particular friends
by appraising the lands ... too low .... There is also a temptation to
strengthen a friend's chances of securing school lands which he has
improved.., simply by appraising his improvements at much above
their actual value and the land correspondingly low." '
The framers knew their time and place. They knew that natural
resources in public hands posed an almost-irresistible temptation to
from the available evidence, seems incorrect. The friendly relations between Bagley and
lumbermen, the role of [Port Madison mill owner George] Meigs in determining university
policy, the departure from standard practice with regard to territorial sale of public land, and
the heavy purchases made by the mills suggest the existence of an agreement to provide
funds for the university and timber for the industry.
Id. at 41.
155. PATRICIA LIMERICK NELSON, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST 84 (1987). "Petitioned
to grant a railroad charter, the first Dakota Assembly members were cautious and reserved-
until the railroad agreed to make 'every member of the Assembly a partner!' True to their
insight into government as a paying business, 'the assemblymen had not hesitated to use their
office to get in on the ground floor of what they considered a very good business deal."' Id.
156. NORMAN H. CLARK, WASHINGTON: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 102 (1976).
In 1908... only a loud public outcry by the Spokane Spokesman-Review prevented
the sale at ten dollars an acre of land in the Okanogan valley belonging to the State
College of Washington-land easily worth more than three times that price. And
there was impressive evidence that the commissioner had allowed casual herds of
opportunists-like the "dummy entrymen" of homestead corruptions-to enter
claims, obtain undervalued state lands, then sell the titles to large timber corporations.
Id. There was also evidence that state timber cruisers deliberately underestimated the amount of
timber on tracts of granted land for the benefit of favored buyers. Hoover, supra note 115, at
212-32.
157. COMMISSIONER OF PUB. LANDS, FIRST BIENNIAL REP. 10 (1890).
158. COMMISSIONER OF PUB. LANDS, SECOND BIENNIAL REP. 38 (1890).
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many of their fellow citizens. They wanted to make sure that the
financial benefits from the sale or exploitation of granted lands flowed
to the schools and other state institutions rather than to corporations
and speculators. They did not worry about sacrificing some financial
benefits to the broader public interest.
Lassen and the other much-quoted rulings about granted lands
reflect similar concerns. Those rulings have one common theme:
neither the lands nor rights to use the lands nor money earned by
selling or leasing the lands can be alienated without compensation.
The question has never been land management. It has been the use of
money from the permanent funds, the relinquishment of contractual
rights, and the granting of easements.
In Lassen, the Court ruled that the Arizona highway department
could not obtain an easement over common school land without pay-
ing for it.159 In 111.2 Acres of Land, the court ruled that the Federal
Bureau of Reclamation Department could not obtain an easement over
common school land without paying for it. 6 ' In Ervien, the court
ruled that the State of New Mexico could not use money from the
common school fund to promote economic development.' 6
Skamania fits this general pattern, in that the court ruled against
a specific legislative giveaway. The legislature had not engaged in
self-dealing, but it had attempted to deal on behalf of identifiable third
parties. The court looked beyond the stated rationale (that aiding the
logging companies would aid the economy, which would ultimately be
good for the public schools) to the statute's real purpose-the financial
benefit of a specific industry-and ruled that the legislation violated
the state's trust duty of undivided loyalty. Instead of getting top dol-
lar for the beneficiaries, the legislature would be easing the financial
burden on a small, identifiable group of constituents.
Not one of these rulings requires state land to be managed in any
particular way or precludes management that is guided in part by
environmental values.
The prevention of self-dealing--or dealing on behalf of identifi-
able third parties-is the crux of the state's fiduciary responsibility.
This is true even if one assumes that the granted lands constitute lim-
ited trusts.
159. Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dept, 385 U.S. 458, 465 (1967). The crux of
Lassen was that "[t]he Enabling Act unequivocally demands both that the trust receive the full
value of any lands transferred from it and that any funds received be employed only for the pur-
poses for which the land was given." Id. at 466.
160. United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (E.D. Wash. 1968).
161. Ervien, 251 U.S. at 41.
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Perhaps the most fundamental duty of a trustee is that he must
display throughout the administration of the trust complete loy-
alty to the interests of the beneficiary and must exclude all self-
ish interest and all considerations of the interests of third
persons.162
This is a very old concept. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi
said: "If a man hire a man to oversee his farm and ... if that man
steal either the seed grain or the fodder and it be found in his hand,
they shall cut off his hand."' 63
In our times, a breach of the duty of loyalty happens most often
when "the trustee, while engaged in a business transaction for the
trust, attempts at the same time to secure a financial advantage for
himself or persons related to him; this is usually forbidden as 'self-
dealing."" 4  But dealing on behalf of other people who are not
beneficiaries is considered just as clear a breach. If "the trustee
attempts to inject into a trust transaction the interest of a third
person .... [t]he attitude of the court.., is the same as where the
interest is that personal to the trustee. "165
All the standard rhetoric about a trustee's extraordinary duty of
loyalty to the trust beneficiary boils down to the same thing: the
trustee cannot put his own or any third party's material interest ahead
of the beneficiary's. To illustrate the undivided loyalty a trustee owes
a beneficiary, Bogert quotes Benjamin Cardozo: "Many forms of con-
duct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place.'
66
Cardozo delivered this ringing description of fiduciary duty in
Meinhard v. Salmon,167 which involved a managing co-adventurer in a
Fifth Avenue hotel lease who did not let his de facto partner in on a
lucrative new real estate deal. The issue was self-dealing pure and
simple. Cardozo was explaining why the defendant could not line his
162. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 73, at 217.
163. H.L. MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1220 (1960).
164. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 73, at 235.
165. Id. at 241.
166. Id. at 217.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion"
of particular exception. ... Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
Id.
167. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1929).
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own pockets without letting his co-adventurer in on the deal. 6 ' His
words have no bearing on a state's ability to consider environmental
values.
E. Neither Congress nor the Framers Gave Any Guidance About the
Management of Granted Lands
In 1889-and certainly in 1853, when Congress first set two sec-
tions in each township aside for common schools in Washington Ter-
ritory-everyone assumed the land would simply be sold.'69 The only
questions were when and how. The constitutional convention consid-
ered and rejected arguments and petitions in favor of keeping the
land. 7 ' The framers decided to sell no more than one-half of it before
1905,17 but they did not address long-term management.
In 1889, when the Washington Constitution was ratified, no one
managed American forests. Gifford Pinchot established the nation's
first managed forest on private land three years later.' Northwestern
"tree farms" date from the period of World War II, some 55 years
later.' Native Americans had long burned underbrush to shape the
landscape, but European-Americans did not. In fact, deliberately set
blazes were known as "Indian fire." Ignited by these deliberate burns
gone awry, careless use of fire by European Americans, sparks from
the steam donkeys and locomotives used in logging, and sometimes
even natural lightning, vast tracts of Washington forest went up in
smoke every summer. "[T]he figures in State Forester [J.R.] Welty's
first annual report [for 1905] reveal that prior to 1905 more timber had
been destroyed by fire than had been logged."' 74  Nevertheless, the
timber industry did not even try to control accidental forest fires until
the early 20th century.
No one had decided what kinds of policies should govern pub-
licly owned forests. The federal government was on the brink of set-
168. Id. at 546.
169. Washington simply followed the pattern set by earlier western states. "[V]arious leas-
ing systems were tried in each of the five states of the old Northwest, and 'in every case it was
discarded as a failure.' In 1827, Ohio petitioned Congress for authority to sell rather than lease
the lands, and thereafter, school lands were generally sold." Fairfax, et al., supra note 5, at 821.
170. ROSENOW, supra note 140, at 39, 41,149.
171. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
172. "The first attempt to practice forestry in America was made ... [i]n 1892[, when]
George W. Vanderbilt employed Gifford Pinchot to manage the forest portion of the Biltmore
Estate[,]... a tract of 7,000 acres in the mountains of western North Carolina." Robert K. Win-
ters, SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, The First Half Century, in FIFTY YEARS OF FOREST-
RY IN THE U.S.A. 4 (1950).
173. FICKEN, supra note 19, at 226.
174. FOREST ADVISORY COMM., supra note 31, at 16.
[Vol. 24:1
2000] Managing Washington's Forests
ting land aside in the first national forest reserves, which later evolved
into the national forests, but the creation of forest reserves did not
imply management. It simply meant that the government would hold
some trees for long-term public benefit instead of handing them over
to the first logger who coveted them. Even after the first forest
reserves took shape, exactly how those trees would be used in the
future remained unclear.
John Muir17 thought they should and would be saved as wilder-
ness. Gifford Pinchot thought they should be managed like European
forests, as renewable sources of wood. Pinchot's view soon prevailed,
but in 1889, even people who expected the federal government to set
forests aside could not have known what the government would do
with them. 176
The state lands were not seriously managed-and, arguably,
were not manageable-until years after the Department of Natural
Resources was created in 1957.
The lands were scattered, ill protected against fire, and not
policed against theft. With the exception of some lands obtained after
statehood from the federal government in exchange for common
school lands that had been included in the national forests, they lay in
isolated sections, too small for even the rudimentary management of
175. John Muir was, of course, the great 19th and early 20th century spokesman for Ameri-
can wilderness. In the late 19th century,
[w]ild country needed a champion, and in... John Muir it found one. Starting in the
1870s, Muir made exploring wilderness and extolling its values a way of life....
Muir's books were minor best sellers, and the nation's foremost periodicals competed
for his essays. The best universities tried to persuade him to join their faculties and,
when unsuccessful, settled for this acceptance of honorary degrees. As a publicizer of
the American wilderness Muir had no equal. At his death in 1914 he had earned a
reputation as "the most magnificent enthusiast about nature in the United States, the
most rapt of all prophets of our out-of-door gospel."
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 122 (rev. ed. 1973).
176. Since the Forest Reserve Act did not specify the function of the reserved areas, John
Muir had reason to believe it was intended to preserve undeveloped forests.... Indeed, a
renewed plea from Muir for a park around Kings Canyon stimulated Secretary of the Inte-
rior John W. Noble's determination to push the reserve bill through Congress ....
[D]isconcerting to conservationists was the lack of any clear definition of the purpose of the
reserves. Muir was content simply to protect the forests in their undeveloped condition.
But [Assistant Land Commissioner Edward A.] Bowers, Bernhard E. Fernow of the federal
Division of Forestry, and a young Yale graduate named Gifford Pinchot had other
ideas.... The Sargent-Muir faction won a temporary victory on February 22, 1897, when
President Grover Cleveland, in the closing days of his administration, established over
21,000,000 acres of forest reserves with no mention of utilitarian objectives.... At once the
foresters, seconded by lumber, grazing and mining interests, howled in protest.... On
June 4, 1897, Congress passed the forest Management Act, which left no doubt that the
reserves would not be wilderness.
Id. at 133-37.
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earlier eras. 7 In many cases they were inaccessible. The state did not
even have an accurate inventory of its land. In 1942, a Forest Advi-
sory Committee appointed by Governor Arthur B. Langlie reported
that "the office of the Commissioner of Public Lands has been, with a
few recent exceptions, a land sales office .... Before the state can
undertake forestry on its own lands, it must know what it has."'7T
Pointing out the tendency of loggers to move to Oregon because
Washington stands were becoming depleted, The Seattle Times report-
ed under the front-page headline, "Drastic Plan Proposed to Save
Timber," the committee's argument that "'[i]f the state's timber is to
be preserved, it is time for the state to take the initiative in forestry
matters and to see that its own lands are properly managed.-
179
On state lands, the group recommended the state enforce proper
slash disposal, allow cutting only under forester direction, coop-
erate with counties in reforesting tax delinquent lands, increase
fire protection, exchange timber lands with private owners to
form the state's holdings into big blocks instead of isolated
stands, expand sustained yield units, build a good road system
to state lands, and make loggers leave residual stands to promote
regrowth.'80
The state did not take this advice. It did not even try very hard
to keep people from stealing timber. "There is no supervision by the
Land Office of the... logger who has purchased, and is removing
state timber," McBee wrote in 1952. "[F]requently, adjacent timber
belonging to the State and not included in the sale is taken.'' 1  In
some "salvage sales," he wrote, "the bids were so high that a true sal-
vage operation could not have been profitably conducted." Obvi-
ously, "[t]he salvage sale has been used as a mean of entry upon land
for the purpose of unlawfully removing green timber.
112
177. People realized that consolidating the state's timber holdings into large blocks, as the
483,000 acres were consolidated, would be advantageous. For example, a 1926 Seattle Times
article describing the triumphs of Land Commissioner Clark V. Savidge observed if he had not
negotiated successfully with the federal government for 483,000 acres, "[tihis timber land...
would still be locked up in the federal reserves in isolated sections, instead of being held in huge
tracts, as it now is." Land Commissioner Savidge Has Long Record of Good Service to Washington,
SEATTLE TIMES, October 26, 1926. No one bothered blocking up the rest of the granted lands.
178. FOREST ADVISORY COMM., supra note 31 at 5.
179. Drastic Plan Proposed to Save Timber, SEATTLE TIMES, August 1, 1942, at 1.
180. Id.
181. MCBEE, supra note 33, at 9.
182. Id. at 14.
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After the Department of Natural Resources was created, its first
big task was taking an inventory of the state's land and forest holdings.
The inventory was not completed until 1966.183
At that time, most of the state's forest land still could not be
reached by road. As late as 1970, 72% of the land had no road
access.' 84 The process of blocking up state forest land into manageable
parcels was very late in coming. After 1980, "[e]fforts were intensified
to exchange land with other forest land owners to consolidate and
'block up' isolated parcels into contiguous blocks.... Since 1957, 499
exchanges were concluded resulting in new blocked-up areas. "185
Any real management of the state forests is a recent phenome-
non. Management practices should not be bound by a contemporary
view of historical expectations, for historically, there were no mean-
ingful expectations. The nineteenth, and even most of the twentieth
century, offers little or no guidance. We should be free to manage the
forests in ways that make sense at the start of the twenty-first century.
As a manager, rather than a trustee, of both granted and Forest
Board lands, the state has a great deal of latitude. There is a critical
difference between getting the maximum return when timber or land
is sold and getting maximum return on the underlying asset value.
The state must strive for the former. It has no obligation to strive for
the latter.
The state's performance as either a trustee or manager will be
judged under an "abuse of discretion" standard. 86 If the beneficiaries
question the state's performance, the courts will ask whether or not the
state has acted with the prudence and undivided loyalty expected of a
trustee.
A trustee abuses its discretion only when it acts arbitrarily, in
bad faith, maliciously or fraudulently .... [S]o long as a trustee
acts not only in good faith but also within the bounds of reason-
able judgment, an abuse of discretion will not be found. 87
If anyone else questions the state's performance, the courts will
ask only if the state has met the procedural standards that any state
agency must meet in carrying out its statutory duties.1
88
A discretionary decision of an administrative agency is not set
aside absent a clear showing of abuse, which in turn is shown by
183. CHAMBERS & SUMMERFIELD, supra note 117, at 2.
184. WASHINGTON ST. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 12.
185. Id. at 13.
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demonstrating that the discretion was exercised in a manner that
was manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds
or for untenable reasons.
89
Clearly, the state has discretion to refrain from selling or cutting
timber. In 1938, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the state
could retain timber land in a sustained-yield forest rather than selling
it to a logging company.1 90 In 1996, the Chelan County Superior
Court ruled that the Department of Natural Resources did not have to
sell lodgepole pine timber threatened by a bark beetle infestation
before it completed an 80-year forest management plan. "[T]he trus-
tee has broad discretion not to act, as long as inaction can be demon-
strated to be prudent.'
' 9'
In recent years, citizens' groups have urged the state to use its
discretion to manage public forests for broader public benefits.'92
"Department of Natural Resources lands are a commercial forest
within which there is a special opportunity to experiment with harvest
techniques. ",19'
The state has freely acknowledged that a forest is more than
standing timber, and that prudent long-term forest management
requires protection of an entire living system. "The department rec-
ognizes that assets owned by the trusts include the entire ecosystem
and manages each site with the entire ecosystem in mind."' 94 Under
the forest resource plan adopted in 1992, "[t]he department will place
189. Id.
190. State ex Tel. Forks Shingle Co. v. Martin, 196 Wash. 494, 83 P.2d 755 (1938). The
court's ruling was potentially broader than that. It said there was nothing wrong with "the
declared policy of the legislature to reserve the timber from present sale, for disposal under some
other plan." Id. at 502.
191. Jon A. Souder & Sally K. Fairfax, Arbitrary Administrators, Capricious Bureaucrats and
Prudent Trustees: Does It Matter in the Review of Timber Salvage Sales? 18 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 181 (1997). "The court unequivocally rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that
managing the Loomis is a no-brainer .... [It said,] 'it is apparent to the Court that "managing"
a forest of this size and diversity is a very complex and vast undertaking."' Id. at 206.
192. The Tiger Mountain State Forest (TMSF) should be developed as a model sus-
tained-yield forest where innovative management practices compatible with an urban envi-
ronment are used to produce prudent timber harvest revenues for the trusts. Such harvest
should be economically profitable, environmentally sound, and maintain and/or enhance
the yield of all other forest resources such as clean water, soil, fish, wildlife and recreation for
present and future beneficiaries.
TIGER MOUNTAIN ST. FOREST ADVISORY COMM., TIGER MOUNTAIN STATE FOREST
RECOMMENDED MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES ix (1984).
193. COMMISSION ON OLD GROWTH ALTERNATIVES FOR WASHINGTON'S FOREST
TRUST LANDS, FINAL REPORT 2 (1989).
194. DEPARTMENT OF NAT. RESOURCES, FOREST RESOURCE PLAN 1 (1992).
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more emphasis on protecting ecosystem diversity and providing habi-
tat for endangered and threatened wildlife and plants."'
9 5
The state must manage its forests in perpetuity. We can be
pretty sure that some management strategies will be bad for the forests
over the long run. But what management strategies will be good over
the coming centuries? What management strategies will produce the
surest future return? What management strategies will be best? It
would be arrogant to presume we knew. Clearly, we should avoid
practices that will destroy or diminish the land's ability to grow trees.
Clearly, we should keep future options open. The Department of
Natural resources
must conserve and enhance natural resources in State forest trust
lands to attain the highest long-term net income from these
lands. In exercising its duties, the department, as trust manager,
must act in a manner that is equitable to all generations, includ-
ing acting reasonably to avoid foreclosing future options of gen-
erating income from the trust assets for future generations. 196
The very nature of the task of managing forest land demands
both flexibility and caution-and a willingness to look beyond what
present beneficiaries think their successors will want. Managing its
forests in perpetuity, the state may legitimately accept a modest rate of
return in order to keep long-term options open. A federal court in
Colorado has observed that "[t]he choice of the trustee to manage the
lands to produce reasonable and consistent income over time is rea-
sonable and prudent given the perpetual nature of the trust. "" So far,
the Department of Natural Resources has applied this approach cau-
tiously. It can be less cautious without shirking its duty to the benefi-
ciaries.
Our understanding of the Enabling Act and the Washington
Constitution has evolved. It would be disingenuous to insist on using
the 1889 view of the state's duty toward the beneficiaries, because we
have long since abandoned this view. The general perception of what
constitutes a "common school" system has changed. If it had not
changed, we would currently have no public high schools in Wash-
195. Id. at 14.
196. Okanogan County v. Belcher, No. 95-2-00867-9 at 8 (Chelan County Supr. Ct. May
30, 1996). "The department does not know all the ways there are to generate income from state
forest lands. The department believes it is prudent to manage these trust assets so that at least
reasonably foreseeable future source of income are not foregone by actions taken today."
DEPARTMENT OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 194, at B-3.
197. Branson School District RE 82 v. Romer, 958 F. Supp. 1501, 1520 (D. Colo. 1997).
"It is axiomatic, of course, that in any final disposition of trust land, the Board is bound to pro-
duce the maximum benefit possible to the public schools." Id.
2000]
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ington State. Insisting rigidly on the original intent underlying the
Enabling Act and the Washington Constitution would lead straight
into a legal quagmire.
Although the people who passed the Enabling Act and the state
constitution did not foresee management under common-law private
trust principles, they clearly did require management of sections 16
and 36 for the exclusive financial benefit of the "common schools."
Virtually everyone treats "common schools" as a synonym for "public
schools." However, the words originally had different meanings. The
convention delegates did not regard "public" and "common" as syno-
nyms. As used in Washington at the time, "common schools" did not
include high schools. The constitution makes this perfectly clear.
Article IX, section 2 says that "[t]he legislature shall provide for a
general and uniform system of public schools," and then explains that
"[tihe public school system shall include common schools, and such
high schools, normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter
be established.""19 It finishes by stating unequivocally that "the entire
revenue derived from the common school land ... shall be exclusively
applied to the support of the common schools." 99
This distinction between schools was thoroughly consistent with
the understanding and politics of the time. A lot of taxpayers thought
high school was a frill for which the public should not have to pay.
Washington Territory did not officially recognize public high schools,
nor did the new state.2"' In the first years of statehood, some people
thought that using public money to fund high schools was illegal." 1
198. WASH. CONST., art. IX, § 2.
199. Id.
200. BIBB, supra note 6, at 105. "According to official reports there were six high schools at
the time Washington became a state, with enrollment of three hundred twenty students. We
might say, then, that save a few feeble attempts, high schools were of little importance during the
territorial period. They had no legal recognition until 1895." Id.
201. Aslateas 1893,
the legitimacy of the high school within the ambiguous framework of the constitution
and laws was only assumed; and [Seattle school board vice-president T.W.] Prosch
gained notoriety as an opponent of the high school .... [H]e believed that the Board
had no legal right to operate the high school as part of the city's common school sys-
tem.... One major newspaper charged that Prosch "has been a member of the board
for several years and has always opposed the high school being organized and contin-
ued. The common schools he deems sufficient education for the state to provide."
Pouw-Bray, Change in the Common School System of Washington State 1889-1899 33-36
(1973) (unpublished masters thesis University of Washington) (on file with the University of
Washington). Members of the school board consulted Judge Thomas Burke. The board presi-
dent subsequently "reported to the full meeting of the Board that Judge Burke, after consultation
with Judge Roger S. Greene and William H. White, the board's attorney, gave the opinion that
the board had no legal right to maintain a high school. The board then voted unanimously that
the high school in Seattle be abolished." Id.
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High schools were soon accepted as an integral part of the public
schools, however. No one has since insisted on preserving Congress'
or the framers' original intent.
As our understanding of the term "common school" has
changed, our view of responsible public land management should
evolve, too. Common law trust principles-and common sense-
require the state to strike a balance between short and long-term
benefits and a prudent diversification of assets. Managing some of the
granted lands for environmental values would provide a baseline
against which to measure other management regimes and, if other
regimes were to fail over the long term, a land base with greater eco-
nomic potential.
In 1996, by a narrow margin, Colorado voters amended their
state's 120-year-old constitution to change the management of com-
mon school lands. Amendment 16 declared that "the economic pro-
ductivity of all lands held in public trust is dependent on sound
stewardship, including protecting the beauty, natural values, open
space and wildlife habitat thereof, for this and future generations.,
202
When the amendment was challenged as a violation of the trust terms
established by Colorado's Enabling Act, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals said,
we believe that the "sound stewardship" principle merely an-
nounces a new management approach for the land trust. The
additional requirement to consider beauty, nature, open space,
and wildlife habitat as part of the whole panoply of land man-
agement considerations simply indicates a change in the state's
chosen mechanism for achieving its continuing obligation to
manage the school lands for the support of the common schools.
A trustee is expected to use his or her skill and expertise in man-
aging a trust, and it is certainly fairly possible for a trustee to
conclude that protecting and enhancing the aesthetic value of a
property will increase its long-term economic potential and pro-
ductivity. The trust obligation, after all, is unlimited in time
and a long-range vision of how best to preserve the value and
productivity of the trust assets may very well include attention
to preserving the beauty and natural values of the property.
20 3
A trustee's prudent long-range vision may very well embrace
beauty and natural values in Washington, too. Colorado's Enabling
Act has not prevented that state from changing its management pre-
mises, so Washington's act, which contains similar terms, should like-
202. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10(1).
203. Branson School District RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 638 (10th Cir. 1998).
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wise pose no obstacle. Washington has never had Colorado's consti-
tutional requirement for maximum revenue, so Washington could
make the change without amending its constitution.
F. The Granted Lands Are Shielded by a Broad Constitutional Trust,
Which Gives Them the Benefit of the Public Trust Doctrine
Applying the public trust doctrine to Washington's state forests
means that the environmental and aesthetic values of the granted lands
must be balanced against the state's duty to earn money for the
schools; those values must be safeguarded for all the people and pre-
served for future generations. °4
The Washington Constitution explicitly recognizes the creation
of a public trust. Article XVI says: "All the public lands granted to
the state are held in trust for all the people."2 While the courts have
read elaborate trust meaning into the ambiguous language of article
IX, they have never given full effect to the unambiguous language of
Article XVI. Yet the courts have stated, "[w]e will not construe or
interpret a constitutional provision that is plain or unambiguous."206
Because Article XVI is unambiguous, the courts must apply the public
trust doctrine to state granted lands.2"7
All parts of the Washington State Constitution must be given
equal weight. "One requirement of the constitution is as mandatory
in its nature as another."20' A constitution must be interpreted in
ways that give effect to every article and, if possible, to every word.
"We have ... consistently stated that ... constitutional provisions
should be construed so that no clause, sentence or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.""2 9 Language in different sections
that seems to conflict must be reconciled. One can easily give effect to
204. "Edmund Burke once said that a great unwritten compact exists between the dead, the
living, and the unborn.... Such an unwritten compact requires that we leave to the unborn
something more than debts and depleted natural resources." State v. Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551,
556, 202 P.2d 906, 908 (1949).
205. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
206. Washington Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Grimm, 119 Wash. 2d 738, 748, 837 P.2d 606,612
(1992).
207. If it does not mean that, the clear language of article XVI is hard to reconcile with the
idea that the constitution set up trusts for the exclusive benefit of public schools and other insti-
tutions.
Washington entered the Union under the Omnibus Enabling Act which did not
establish a trust. Washington's state constitution clearly did so .... [Iit states unam-
biguously that "all lands granted are held in trust for all the people." [I]f the trust is
to benefit all the people, it is not clear how undivided loyalty ought to be defined.
Fairfax et al., supra note 5, at 846.
208. State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter 50 Wash. 175 (1908).
209. Grimm, 119 Wash. 2d at 746, 837 P.2d at 610-11.
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Article XVI and resolve its apparent conflict with Article IX: one need
only recognize that Article XVI creates a public trust that coexists
with and underlies the interests of specific beneficiaries in the granted
lands.
The public trust doctrine has always existed in Washington.210
This doctrine, which dates to Roman and old English common law,
resembles "a covenant running with the land ... for the benefit of the
public and the land's dependent wildlife. '1 The courts apply it on a
case-by-case basis. In each case, the courts must balance the broad
public trust interest against a narrower, conflicting interest. This may
involve reexamining a decision made years or even decades before.
A public trust interpretation of Washington's management
responsibilities is consistent with the events and concerns existing in
1889. At that time, people who worried that public resources would
be stolen or given away may have taken some comfort from the idea
that an inalienable public interest underlies state ownership of the
granted lands. Three years later, in the seminal Illinois Central Rail-
road case, the United States Supreme Court decided that a public trust
interest did underlie Illinois' interest in the bed of Lake Michigan.
The Court held that the state could not legally sell the lake bed to the
Illinois Central Railroad. The case laid the foundation for modern
public trust doctrine law in the United States.
Could a case decided in 1892 have influenced Washington State
constitutional delegates meeting three years earlier? It could have.
The case spent ten years making its way through the courts. While
there is no evidence that people in Washington were aware of the legal
doctrines involved in the case, there is no reason to doubt it. The con-
stitutional convention and the leadership of the territory were well
supplied with lawyers who had been born in the Midwest and may
well have retained a personal interest in legal controversies there.213
Personal connections aside, the Illinois Central was no minor regional
railroad.21 4 In fact, it was publicly contemplating a line to Puget
210. Orion Corporation v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987).
211. Id. (quoting Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 J.ENVTL.
L. & LITIG., 107, 118 (1986)). "The heart of the public trust doctrine... is that it imposes lim-
its and obligations on governments." Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public
Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 284 (1980).
212. In the seminal "Mono Lake case," the California Supreme Court ruled that "plaintiffs
can rely on the public trust doctrine in seeking reconsideration of the allocation of the waters of
the Mono Basin." National Audubon Soc. v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 732
(Cal. 1983).
213. ROSENOW, supra note 140, at 465-90.
214. It was the railroad for which Abraham Lincoln had worked as a lawyer. It had
employed many Civil War generals on both sides of the conflict, including McClellan, Burnside,
20001
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Sound.215 The leadership of Washington Territory would have known
all about the Illinois Central and its legal conflicts. At the time, the
public trust doctrine applied only to navigable waters. Washington's
constitutional language extended it to dry land.
Over the years, the scope of the public trust doctrine has
expanded dramatically. Originally, it protected the public rights to
navigation and fishing. In more recent American law, it has been
expanded to protect environmental quality, wildlife habitat, and aes-
thetic beauty.216 Washington courts have already extended the
doctrine beyond rights of navigation and commercial fishing to "inci-
dental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing and other
related recreational purposes." '217
Now, even in the absence of explicit constitutional language, the
pubic trust doctrine could easily encompass environmental and aes-
thetic values on publicly owned forest land. 218  The Washington
and Beauregard. In 1850, it had received the first federal land grant for railroad construction. In
1889, the year of the convention, it finished building what was then the longest metal bridge in
the world. (The bridge spanned the Ohio River at Cairo, Illinois.) It operated the rail route
between Chicago and New Orleans. Under the leadership of E.H. Harriman, it was pushing
tracks west of the Mississippi <http://icrrhistorical.org/icrr.history.html>.
215. In June, word leaked out that a railroad survey crew had left Pierre, South Dakota in
search of a route to the Sound and that speculators from Dubuque had already headed west to
buy up land along the probable right-of-way. Illinois Central Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1889, at 2.
216. "Several courts have recognized environmental quality as a public trust interest."
RALPH W. JOHNSON, ET AL., WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE AND COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT IN WASHINGTON STATE 59 (1991).
"Even without relying on the expansion of the doctrine to encompass parklands, beaches, and
nonnavigable waters, or to protect interests such as recreation, aesthetics, and ecological diver-
sity, there is sufficient precedent and logical justification for including wildlife within the cover-
age of resources protected by the public trust doctrine." Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme:
Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife," 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 728
(1989). In ruling that certain land near the Missouri River was subject to the public trust doc-
trine, an Iowa court took "judicial notice of the expanding involvement of Iowans in recreational
activities... [that] include hiking, camping, biking and picnicking" there. State v. Sorenson, 436
N.W.2d 358, 363 (Iowa 1989).
217. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987).
218. Under Washington law, environmental quality and water quality are probably also
protected interests. The public's interest in fishing can only be realized if water quality and
quantity are adequate to support fish. Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court indicated
in Orion that it would look favorably on a claim that protecting the environment is a public
interest.... [11n another footnote, the court cited Marks v. Whitney, a California case which
recognized the public interest not only in ecological values, but also in preserving tidelands
in their natural state. Therefore, given the proper case, the Washington Supreme Court
may well follow several other states by recognizing water quality and environmental preser-
vation as public trust interests.
JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 216, at 58.
Extension of protected public trust interests to include preservation of aesthetic or
scenic beauty is rather unproblematic. Indeed, for the sightseer, the enjoyment of
natural beauty is a form of recreation, which the court has already recognized as a
Managing Washington's Forests
Supreme Court has explicitly left open the door to broader applica-
tions, noting that "[r]ecognizing science's ability to identify the public
need, state courts have extended the doctrine beyond its navigational
aspects," and stating that the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion
"to decide the total scope of the doctrine. 219
The actual use made of Washington's state forests suggests that
they have in fact been regarded and treated as a public trust. Al-
though the state has never acknowledged a public trust interest in the
granted lands, in many respects, it has managed those lands as if a
public trust existed. It has permitted ranchers in isolated communities
to treat the state forests as commons.220 It has permitted all citizens to
use the granted lands for recreation. Citizens have been free to walk
there, use human-powered and motorized boats there, ride mountain
bikes, ATVs, and snowmobiles there, camp, hunt, fish, and trap there.
The Department of Natural Resources' current policy states that
"[t]he department will provide access for multiple uses on state forest
lands. "221 The current recreational uses all correspond to established
public trust interests. These uses are not required or even explicitly
permitted by the Enabling Act or the Washington Constitution. Not
all states permit such a range of uses on granted lands.222 The fact that
Washington does permit them implies that Washington tacitly recog-
nizes a public trust interest in its granted lands.
Public expectations about the management of state forests must
be protected by a public trust. The people of Washington seem to
agree that a public trust governs the state forests. 223  "A specialist on
protected interest. Several other states have recognized aesthetic beauty as a legiti-
mate public trust interest.
Id. at 65. "The principal values plaintiffs seek to protect ... are recreational and ecological....
[I]t is clear that protection of these values is among the purposes of the public trust." National
Audubon Soc. v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
219. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
220. See PUBLIC FORESTRY FOUND., supra note 126, at 13. "Cattle grazing and fire
suppression were the main management activities on the Loomis Forest until 1957." Okanogan
County v. Belcher, No. 95-2-00867-9 at 5 (Chelan County Supr. Ct. May 30, 1996).
221. DEPARTMENT OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 194 at 41.
222. Montana and New Mexico require permits, Colorado requires leases, and three states,
Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas, permit no recreational access at all. Souder, State Trust Lands at
272.
223. Actually, the people of many states have reached the same conclusion.
Under growing pressure from environmental interests, the courts and the trustees are
beginning to find a place on school trust lands for subsidized recreation and hunting
access, and even for aesthetic preservation. Trustees are on notice, we believe, that
their [supposed] mandate to maximize returns for the beneficiary does not free them
from the growing public demand that profit be obtained by methods that are as aes-
thetically and environmentally sensitive as possible.
Id. at 275.
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Washington's state trust lands, Professor Thomas Waggener, has cau-
tioned against the widespread public perception of these grant lands as
properties that are publicly owned for 'public use. '' 224 Public expecta-
tions are crucial. "The central idea of the public trust is preventing
the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common....
The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such
public expectations against destabilizing change., 225 One can attribute
the attitude of Washington citizens to ignorance, but one can just as
well attribute it to an intuitive grasp of the public trust and argue that
the public trust doctrine must be applied to protect their legitimate
expectations.
A public trust intent can be reconciled with the prevailing legal
decisions and interpretations rendered by Washington courts. This
interpretation would not deny or abridge the public schools' interest in
the granted lands; it would simply recognize another, underlying
interest. It would not change the state's obligation to use money gen-
erated by the granted lands solely for the benefit of the schools. It
would not open the door to self-dealing or to dealing on behalf of spe-
cific third parties, the situation with which Skamania dealt. It would
not foreclose any future management options or any potential long-
term benefits to the public schools.226 Public trust values would have
to be balanced against other values on a case by case basis.227 If the
224. COMMISSION ON OLD GROWTH ALTERNATIVES, supra note 193, at 16.
225. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188, 193 (1980). "The historical lesson of customary law is that the fact of
expectations rather than some formality is central.... Our task is to identify the trustee's obli-
gation with an eye toward insulating those expectations that support social, economic and eco-
logical systems from avoidable destabilization and disruptions." Id.
226. It also would not threaten private industry's ability to manage timber on its own acre-
age. Industry has historically opposed stricter environmental regulation of the granted lands,
fearing that new rules would eventually extend to private land. If the public trust doctrine were
applied to state forests, industry would have nothing to fear. Unlike a law of general application
or even a set of regulations based solely on administrative choice, the public trust doctrine could
not spill over onto privately owned land.
227. "As the list of protected public trust uses grows, new questions arise. Conflicts will
arise between two or more public trust interests.... It is unlikely that courts will or even should
set up a rigid hierarchy of public trust uses. Perhaps the best answer is balancing competing
uses." Johnson, et al., supra note 216, at 66. Some commentators worry that the public trust
doctrine does not guarantee an outcome and does not even give any guidance for conducting the
balancing process.
[T]he Mono Lake case is inspiring for its recognition of the impact of activities within
the Mono Lake basin, but.., also evidences the shortcomings of the doctrine at its
current stage of evolution. [T]he court of appeals . . . did not demand a particular
outcome; rather, it dictated that 'some responsible body' should reconsider the alloca-
tion of waters of the Mono basin after conducting a public trust analysis. It gave no
guidance on how that analysis should be done, nor what the result should be....
When public trust resources are at stake, the critical issue centers around resolving
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economic value of the timber and the schools' need for revenue
increased markedly, the courts could open the door to economic
exploitation of those forests at a later date.
III. CONCLUSION
Skamania's view of the granted lands was badly distorted, but it
might be futile, at this late date, to argue that the management of those
lands was not governed by some form of trust. It might also be unde-
sirable. Trust prohibitions against self-dealing or dealing on behalf of
third parties, as well as trust obligations to protect the financial inter-
ests of posterity, provide excellent guidelines for managing public
resources.
Let us not grudgingly concede, but rather, actively embrace the
idea that these lands are held in trust. But let us remember that the
"trust" lands do not form the assets of common law trusts, and that
they were never meant to produce maximum revenue. Nor have they
ever fully financed the state's public school system. Currently, the
granted lands provide none of the schools' operating or maintenance
funds and only about 25% of school construction costs. This money
remains important to local school districts, but the state uses it to
reimburse districts for costs incurred years earlier. The timing,
amount, and even basic availability of these reimbursement payments
has become uncertain. Local taxpayers must still come up with the
full cost of new buildings.
The balance of public interests and equities is, therefore, less
stark than it seems. The state does not face a choice between protect-
ing habitat and fully funding school construction. It faces a choice
between ignoring habitat in order to fund a small percentage of school
construction and protecting habitat at the cost of funding a slightly
smaller percentage of school construction.
conflicting uses or activities.... For example, should loggers be prohibited from
clearcutting forests to protect squirrel habitats? ... To help resolve such issues...
Jack Archer and I have proposed a priority of use analysis for ocean and nearshore
resource conflicts. .. . First, non-exclusive uses should be presumptively favored over
exclusive uses. A second presumption would favor activities that involve reversible
versus irreversible commitments of resources.... [Finally,] a presumption in favor of
decisions that preserve biodiversity should be instituted. In addition ... we recom-
mend that the resource user ... should have to prove that her activity will not inter-
fere with other legitimate uses and that the activity will be conducted in an environ-
mentally sound manner.
M. Casey Jarman, The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine for Resource-Based Area- Wide Manage-
ment: What Lessons Can We Learn from the Navigable Waters Trust? 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
13 (1994).
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
The state could do school districts more good by, for example,
eliminating the sales tax on materials and services used in school con-
struction than by wringing every last dollar out of forest land. Under
the current system-because money from the Common School Con-
struction Fund reimburses districts for money paid in taxes-the state
is, in effect, cutting trees on common school land to subsidize the gen-
eral fund. Arguably, this violates both the Enabling Act and the
Washington State Constitution.
The state does have a continuing duty to help pay school con-
struction costs. But, even if we view that obligation as a trustee's sol-
emn fiduciary duty, let us remember that the granted lands are
protected by two overlapping trusts. A broad public trust has always
existed. Courts have ignored this trust,228 but they have not extin-
guished it. The trust is still there, and because it is, the environmental
and aesthetic values of the granted lands must be safeguarded for all
people, in all generations to come. The state's obligation to the public
trust beneficiaries is every bit as strong as its obligation to the public
schools.
228. The Skamania court was not even asked to interpret the meaning of "all the people" or
to rule on management for lasting, nonfinancial public benefits.
[Vol. 24:1
